Women in Parliament Study
Obstacles and Opportunities for Female Political Representation and Gender Sensitive Policies

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Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

Equality matters. And if we are to understand the barriers that get in the way, we need to understand their political roots. That is why this research project is so important. It is designed to unpack the relationship between women's representation in parliament, the obstacles in the way, and the subsequent success or otherwise of lawmakers passing law and regulations which are better for economic and social inclusion.

Being based on both a qualitative and quantiative cross-country statistical analysis, the present study seeks to include developmental variables such as the Human Development Index to identify the extent to which other factors related to international development influence gender equality. This is particularly important in the context of the achievement of the Sustainable Development Objectives and inclusive growth, which require equal socioeconomic opportunities for both men and women. Indeed, it is difficult to analyze development issues, such as gender equality, separately since they are interdependent and interact with each other.

Furthermore, by conducting interviews with women parliamentarians, this paper is able to better understand the obstacles that women face when entering parliament and passing legislation, shedding light on the role of political systems, structural and developmental conditions, cultural values and perceptions, in producing laws aimed at advancing women's socioeconomic rights and inclusion. The interviews conducted in 20 different countries provide useful information about common obstacles experienced by women legislators worldwide as well as local particularities, conforming a comprehensive analysis of the lawmaking processes related to gender equality.

I hope you find the study useful. We hope that by identifying common elements and differences in the responses, we can play a part in knocking down the barriers that stand in the way of female politicians changing the world for the better.

Liam Byrne MP, UK and Chair of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and IMF

Women Political Leaders

How can the world achieve equality between men and women when the legislation that regulates daily freedoms, opportunities and privileges does not provide equal opportunities and discrimination against women is built into legal systems around the world?

During the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, Women Political Leaders articulated a clear call for action: "Ditch laws that treat men and women as not equal."

To date, according to the World Bank's Women, Business and the Law Report, only eight economies in the world enshrine men's and women's socio-economic equality in their legislation. Progress is stagnant. A mere decade ago, no country in the world afforded women equal socio-economic legislative rights; 10 years later, only eight countries have made the necessary effort to fully protect economic equality through legal frameworks.

To better understand how equality is impacted by legal barriers and the percentage of women in parliaments, Women Political Leaders, in conjunction with the World Bank Group and the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank & International Monetary Fund, carried out an article under the guidance of Victoria Budson, Executive Director of the Women and Public Policy Program at the Harvard Kennedy School. This study pairs a rigorous quantitative analysis, studying the relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the effectiveness of legal frameworks that repair gender inequalities, alongside an in-depth qualitative analysis of women parliamentarians' experiences in parliaments.

This article offers a unique and essential understanding of how to achieve this progress – and fast.

Women, and the world, can no longer afford to wait for equality. Now, as the world addresses the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, is the time to reflect on how the world can best create a new normal with equality for women at the centre of the equation.

Silvana Koch-Mehrin, President and Founder, Women Political Leaders

Preface

The following article is a collaboration among leaders and researchers invested to further the understanding of the important links between those who serve in public office, and the policy outcomes that follow political representation. More specifically, this article seeks to address the following question:

Does a higher number of elected women in deliberative bodies increase the quantity, and quality, of legislation that promotes gender socioeconomic equality?

Those of us working on this study were interested in investigating other similarly fundamental questions, such as: does an increase in the number of women in office lead to more legislation that is drafted, and that is moved onto the floor? If so, does this process pass more readily with a higher proportion of women elected? Does the percentage of women in a governing body matter—and if so, is there a tipping point? Is there an effect that arises with new entrants to the system that fades over time? Or is it true that, as seniority increases together with female political tenure, we see a rise in legislation that acts on women's behalf? Does power increase as "novelty" of women's participation fades? How are legislative outcomes shaped by the elected women's minority or majority statuses in their country? This article brings us a step closer to understanding these questions.

Throughout my career working on behalf of the empowerment, equality, and longevity of women's rights, I have come to firmly believe that the two most important levers affecting access to equality are 1) the ability of women, and people of all genders, to independently support themselves, and their dependents, over the totality of their adult life; and 2) the statutory protections and constitutional rights that recognize their legal agency. Notably, the latter is not static and involves constant vigilance, and scrutiny.

 "Descriptive representation" refers to the extent that elected leaders share attributes and experiences with the groups of people they represent. Currently, political systems worldwide show evidence that, despite the ambition of leaders to effectively represent constituencies whose experiences do not overlap with their own, they fail to correctly identify, promulgate, and represent such issues in a comprehensive manner. This is this challenge that brings us to examine the relationship between women's descriptive representation and the subsequent policy changes. We urgently need to support women's equality, and improve legal frameworks that give them agency, all across the globe.

This study shows a relationship between the percent of women within a parliamentary body and the increase in gender equality regulations and laws produced by that body. The results also found that, a variable proxying for "expected years of education", in addition to the percentage of women in parliament, has a positive impact in the gender equality legislative framework. This

is an important finding that supports the role of female leadership in both enabling education attainment,[1] and adding effect to the advancement of social outcomes. These two complementary factors provide key insights to understanding how we reach increased legislative outcomes supporting women's equality.

It is vital that political leaders and the academics, activists, practitioners, and citizens who elect them *and* hold them accountable work to create a political system that no longer requires descriptive representation. Rather, it would be a system that makes the lives and needs of the "other" (in this case, women and girls) transparent in policy--and that such transparency would result in the kinds of practical laws that stave off the type of unintended consequence that result in systemic bias and unmet needs.

However, until that goal is achieved, it is critical that investments be made in making political systems accessible to women to ensure greater statutory protections that enable women to live and work with equality. Moreover, we must continue to conduct this kind of comprehensive analysis that further untangles the meaning and impact of women's electoral success, and the corresponding outcomes of the betterment of women's lives.

Victoria Budson, founder and Executive Director of the Women and Public Policy Program (WAPPP) at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government

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[1] https://epod.cid.harvard.edu/publications/female-leadership-raises-aspirations-and-educational-attainment-girls-policy

Executive Summary

The Women in Parliaments Article examines the question: does greater female representation in parliament correlate to legislation that reduces socio-economic barriers for women or advances their socio-economic status in society? In addition, it offers critical insights into the most significant obstacles that female parliamentarians face when entering parliament.

In 1995, the year of the signing of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on gender equality and empowerment, the proportion of women holding seats in parliament was 11.3%. Twenty-five years later, women hold only 25% of seats in parliament.[2] Women account for more than half of the world's population, yet representative inequalities in national parliaments prevent their voices, concerns, and needs from being heard.

The same is true for socio-economic legislation that upholds the principle of equality. According to the 2020 Women, Business and the Law Report, only eight economies fully enshrined gender equality in their socio-economic legislation and policies.

Ending gender inequalities relies on improving other areas of development, such as decision-making structures, education, economic opportunity, and vice versa. This study, in keeping with the underlying principle of the interconnectedness of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, maintains that when more female parliamentarians are able to take a seat at the decision-making table, and champion gender-sensitive socio-economic policies, all of society benefits - not just women.

Key Findings

- Our study quantifies a direct positive correlation between the percentage of women in parliament and improvements to national socio-economic policies for women as measured by the Women, Business and the Law (WBL) Index score.[3]

- The study presents qualitative evidence to identify leading catalysts for female representation and their correlated socio-economic impacts, including education, institutional support in the form of quotas, and pre-existing legislative frameworks.

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[2]IPU Parline Database (Retrieved 24 September 2020: https://data.ipu.org/women-averages)
[3]The WBL Index measures legal differences between women's and men's access to socio-economic opportunities in 190 economies across eight indicators and was utilised for this report as a benchmark for socio-economic equality between women and men.

- Our analysis provides further qualitative evidence to the primary obstacles encountered by women seeking office and in the process of crafting gender-equitable legislation including factionalism, cultural bias and false perceptions.

Supporting Evidence

- The variable "expected years of education,"[4] alongside the percentage of women in parliament, is positively correlated to improvements in socio-economic legislative frameworks for women.

- 60% of interviewed parliamentarians from across geographical regions acknowledged quotas as an important measure to meaningfully advance women's political participation.

- 86% of survey participants cite cultural perceptions of gender as having an impact on the percentage of women in parliament.

- Survey responses suggest that pre-existing legislation is a key factor in whether or not legislation that addresses women's socio-economic inequalities can be proposed, produced and/or passed.

- Some Members of Parliament indicate that power politics within parties and between branches of government determine the support or rejection of certain legislation.

- Parliamentarians also identify a masculine parliamentary culture as harmful to legislation that specifically affects women, in addition to contributing to a lack of confidence in women's perceived ability to address "hard policy" topics.

Contributions and limitations of the article

Any correlations of female representation in parliament underscored in the study are contingent on two caveats. First, the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses do not allow for the establishment of causal relationships. Therefore, when referring to a potential 'impact' in the present analysis, it should be understood only as a suggestion of what might be achieved if more women were represented in parliament. The quantitative analysis looks explicitly at descriptive representation to substantiate the existence of a positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and legal frameworks that remove structural

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[4]As defined by the Human Development Index.

barriers to access. Second, the insights of the female parliamentarians serve to enhance the quantitative findings by offering specific examples and understandings, however, they do not present conclusive evidence.

In addition to this, the primal intention of the survey and its qualitative analysis, is not to provide explanatory results that can be generalized globally, but to understand how legislative processes and obstacles in regard to gender equality operate inside parliament. In this context, we believe that providing the present study with experiences and insights from women parliamentarians from around the world can contribute to shed light on some of the obstacles faced by female legislators when trying to pass this kind of legislation as well as on their main concerns regarding these crucial issues. Therefore, we hope that the analysis and the survey in question will help to improve our understanding over these questions by complementing the existent literature on the subject as well as identifying new problems of relevancy that could increase our understanding of the subject.

This article contributes to the literature on women's representation in political leadership by:

1. Presenting complementary quantitative and qualitative analyses that offer insights into the obstacles women face when entering parliament and when passing or proposing legislation related to women's access to socio-economic opportunities.
2. Providing a cross-country measurement of the effect that women in parliament have on the existence of legislation that either removes existing socio-economic obstacles for women or advances their socio-economic status.
3. Underscoring detailed insights from women parliamentarians across geographic locations to better understand specific challenges and how they are related to more general trends.

Introduction: A virtuous circle? Exploring the relationship between the percentage of women in parliament, equality and international development

"When the composition of decision-making assemblies is so markedly at odds with the gender make-up of the society they represent, this is clear evidence that certain voices are being silenced and suppressed."

- Anne Phillips, Politics of Presence, 1991

The year 2020 marks the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, a revolutionary blueprint for advancing women's rights. It is a defining moment to measure achievements and to reflect critically on the challenges that remain in improving women's political representation and leadership globally. Not only is it essential for decision-making bodies to reflect the composition of the societies they represent, but this paper adopts the stance that it is also crucial to international development as effective representation will improve the lives of people of all genders -- as embodied by Sustainable Development Goal 5.

There is no doubt that progress has been achieved - the number of female parliamentarians has more than doubled from 11.3% to 25% in the last 25 years.[5] Nevertheless, on the road to equality there remains much to be traveled. It is important to consider that women make up more than half of the world's population and that rectifying representative inequalities in parliaments is merely one stop on this journey, albeit a critical one.

Indeed, achieving equality between women and men in parliaments would be significant for the global political community in several ways. Equal representation not only fulfills the democratic imperative of gender parity in parliament, but also increases the chances that policies seeking to remove structural inequalities are being proposed and passed. As a result of their own experience, some female representatives may notice more acutely when legislation is lacking in areas related to gender equality and, subsequently, promote legislation aimed at protecting the rights of women and people of all genders.

Support for open research
The World Bank Group, the Women Political Leaders (WPL) and the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are pleased to support open research on women's political representation to advance the global discussion on this significant topic. This article aims to take stock of female political representation's impact on policies that improve women's access to socio-economic opportunities by either removing barriers for women or advancing their socio-economic status in society. In addition, this paper intends to provide useful insights for public policies and research, while promoting the exchange of

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[5] IPU Parline Database (Retrieved 24 September 2020: https://data.ipu.org/women-averages)

knowledge and strategies for attaining gender equality. By identifying the effect that women's representation in parliaments may have on policies that champion gender equality, this study offers significant material for legislative agendas.

Women's representation & the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Target 5.5 of Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality seeks to "ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life." Meanwhile, Target 5.A underscores the need to champion reforms that "give women equal rights to economic resources as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property." 5.C highlights the global community's responsibility to "adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels."

These targets suggest that the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 5 – i.e. gender equality and empowerment – hinges upon women's equal representation in politics as well as the passing of gender-sensitive reforms and policies.

SDG 5 also depends on improvements in other areas of the Development Agenda such as SDG 4 (Quality Education) and 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), or vice versa (Stakeholder Forum, 2015).[6] Consequently, ending gender inequality relies on the ability of the global collective to improve other areas of development, such as education, inclusive leadership, property rights and economic growth.

This implies that when more women are able to take a seat at the decision-making table, the entire world will benefit -- not just women. While individual countries may need to overcome unique obstacles that vary according to the level of development, the underlying premise of the 2030 Agenda rests on a holistic approach to the attainment of the individual goals. Consequently, this paper looks forward to analyzing the political and socio-economic inclusion of women through the legislative branch, and its faculties, while introducing variables related to socio-economic development, such as inequality and education, into the analysis.

Research scope
This article aims to contribute to the literature on women's representation in political leadership by presenting complementary quantitative and qualitative analyses that offer insights into the obstacles that women face when entering parliament and when passing or proposing policies that positively impact women's access to socio-economic opportunities.

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[6] Universal Sustainable Development Goals : Understanding the Transformational Challenge for Developed Countries, Report of a Study by Stakeholder Forum, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=1684&menu=1515.

For the qualitative analysis, an online survey of women parliamentarians across geographical regions was designed to help discern what specific obstacles female parliamentarians may face when entering parliament or while producing, passing or proposing legislation that either removes barriers preventing women from accessing equal socio-economic opportunities or legislation that advances women's socio-economic standing in society. The purpose of this analysis is to provide empirical insight and to set the stage for future research by understanding how parliamentarians deal with systemic, cultural and political obstacles when trying to improve gender equality through the legislative process.

This paper will also contribute to the literature by providing a cross-country measurement on the effect that women in parliament have on the existence of legislation that removes socio-economic obstacles for women or, alternatively, legislation that advances women's socio-economic empowerment.

The quantitative analysis aims at supporting the findings advanced in the first section by providing a regression model seeking to explore the extent to which greater female representation in parliament relates to an increase in legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women or advances their socio-economic status in society. Because substantive representation - namely measuring the objectives and particular interests women take into consideration when drafting legislation - is difficult to analyze through the use of a cross-country quantitative prism, this study looks explicitly at descriptive representation - i.e. to what extent greater female representation in parliament relates to an increase in gender-sensitive socio-economic legislation - to substantiate the existence of a positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the quality of legal frameworks that advance women's access to socio-economic opportunities.

Article outline

First, the study contextualizes the importance of the research by conducting an extensive literature review on women's representation in parliaments and their potential impact on political representation and gender equal legal frameworks. Second, the qualitative research seeks to provide key insights into the dynamics between these variables by exposing obstacles to women's political inclusion and the passing of legislation that improves women's economic and social conditions. Last, a cross-country regression model seeks to strengthen the findings and establish a correlation between the proportion of women in parliament and the quality of legislative frameworks that improve women's socio-economic rights. Additionally, the model incorporates the level of development of countries in order to account for other areas of development that might influence this relationship.

Literature Review: Women's representation in parliament: increasing, but still lagging behind

Women remain underrepresented in parliaments around the world. According to data compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) on women in national parliaments, as of 2020, only 25% of the world's parliamentarians are women.

Women continue to confront entrenched social, legislative, cultural and economic barriers that constrain their ability to participate in political life. These systemic inequalities are in part responsible for the lack of improvement in increased numbers of female parliamentarians globally.

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Quotas and their effects

In general, over the past two decades, the number of women in parliaments and in politics has increased considerably. This increase is attributed by many researchers to the introduction of gender quotas, which require that a given percentage of seats is reserved for women. Quotas can be applied to party lists as well as to parliamentary seats (Dahlerup 2005). Furthermore, quotas are more likely to be introduced in countries where national activism surrounding women's groups abounds, as Kang and Tripp (2018) show in a study analyzing quotas in Africa. Quotas are the subject of a large literature examining their effects on women's representation; these effects can be divided into three categories:

1. **Descriptive representation:** the impact of quotas on the total number of women elected;
2. **Substantive representation:** the impact of quotas on which political objectives are pursued by women parliamentarians and which laws are allowed to pass as a result;
3. **Symbolic representation:** the impact of the presence of women parliamentarians on voter and elected representatives' perceptions.

Effects of quotas on descriptive representation

Many studies have examined the effects of quotas on the presence of women in parliament. Jones (2009) argues that quotas have a profound positive impact on the election of women, regardless of the type of party list (closed or open). Krook (2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of gender quotas by examining why they were adopted, their effects on patterns of representation and other factors determining their impact. Paxton, Hughes and Painter (2010), while confirming that quotas have an impact on women's political participation, find that the impact remains lower than what is legally required. O'Brien (2012) examines the impact of quotas on the descriptive representation of women in Uganda and concludes that women elected to reserved seats are no different from the other women elected, in terms of education, professional background, etc. It is also worth noting that the design of quota systems significantly impacts their effectiveness. For example, some argue that reserved seats represent an effective solution only when they are accompanied by sanctions (Horowitz 2009).

Effects of quotas on substantive representation

Numerous studies examine the effects that the number of women in parliament have on debate and legislation. According to Devlin and Elgie (2008), in Rwanda, the introduction of quotas in 2003 resulted in women's issues being raised more easily and more often in parliamentary debate. Conversely, the increase in women's representation has had little effect on political outcomes. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) come to the same conclusion: quotas allow for a broadening of the political agenda that does not necessarily translate into concrete changes in decision-making. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), analyzing village councils in India where quotas had been introduced, found that leaders invest more in infrastructure that directly addresses the needs of their own gender. In a case study on Tanzania, Yoon (2011) concludes that the increase in the number of women parliamentarians elected through quotas has increased women's contributions to parliamentary debates, in addition to bringing more issues affecting women, children and families to the forefront. Women parliamentarians in Tanzania are more openly pursuing an agenda that advances the rights of women, especially since the election of the first female Speaker of Parliament.

Meanwhile, a study on pro-women legislation in the Ugandan parliament, Wang (2013), finds that the increased number of women in parliament does contribute to the adoption of pro-women policies. Nevertheless, supporting factors, such as the role of male colleagues and the relationships between female parliamentarians and civil society actors, should not be underestimated. Finally, in research on co-sponsorship activity in the 103rd and 104th U.S. Congresses, Swers (2011) finds that women increase their activity concerning issues that are specific to women when they are able to access strategic positions of power.

Effects of quotas on symbolic representation

Among studies on the symbolic effects of quotas, Beaman et al. (2012) consider quotas' impact on women's career ambitions. O'Connell (2018), using empirical evidence from India, shows that exposure to quotas substantially increases girls' school enrolment. Alexander (2012) also demonstrates that quotas have a positive symbolic impact on perceptions of women's ability to govern. Horvath (2018) similarly reveals that increasing exposure to women's representation in politics elevates women's confidence and helps combat prejudices. Finally, as illustrated by Funk, Morales and Taylor-Robinson (2017) in a study on Costa Rica, the presence of a significant proportion of women in parliament enables women to feel more liberated and active in their work, particularly in committees.

Obstacles to women's entry in parliaments

In their study, Kokkonen and Wängnerud (2017) have shown that male politicians react unfavorably to party quotas; the higher the proportion of women in politics, the less likely they are to support gender equality. Similarly, Bauer (2010) demonstrates that a significant portion of male parliamentarians reject the idea of gender quotas on the grounds that they favor women and may lead to the election of unqualified women. Shvedova (2005) identifies three main obstacles to women's participation in politics: political, socio-economic or ideological and psychological. A central political barrier for women is the existence of a "male model" of political life as well as a subsequent lack of access to well-developed education and training mechanisms for women's leadership. Socio-economic barriers include the absence of financial resources, illiteracy and limited access to education, and the burden of domestic chores on top of professional obligations, etc. Finally, ideological and psychological barriers are related to cultural models that assign predetermined social roles to women and their representation in the media as well as men.

Determinants of the descriptive representation of women in parliaments
Political systems and parties

Political systems and party functioning greatly influence the descriptive representation of women in parliaments. Norris (1993) has developed a comprehensive model that focuses on the political system, party context and socio-economic elements. The election of women is favored by electoral systems with party lists, proportional representation (PR) and large constituencies. In a PR system with large constituencies, a woman may be placed lower on the party list and still be elected (Matland & Brown 1992, Norris 1996).

However, variations in descriptive representation of women are even greater between parties than between nations and political systems (Wangnerud 2009). Party ideology has an important effect on women's representation. Left-wing parties are more likely to have women elected. However, this factor is becoming less important as there are more and more women in parties in Western democracies, regardless of their ideological orientation, although religious and far-right parties still have few elected women (Kittilson 2006). Moreover, when one party makes gender equality and women's representation a major issue, other

parties tend to do the same (Kittilson 2006, Lovenduski & Norris 1993). Party organization is also important. Parties with a centralised organisation and links to organizations outside the party favor the election of women (Kittilson 2006). The presence of women in senior positions in parties and their links to women's movements is a positive factor in women's representation (Kittilson 2006).

Cultural and socio-economic explanations
Gender culture
Comparative research on the global descriptive representation of women shows significant variations between regions of the world. As an illustration, parliaments in the Nordic countries have substantially more women than other regions, and this has been the case since the 1980s. One possible explanation is gender egalitarian culture and values, which is defined by Pfau-Effinger (1998) as a set of gender-related societal ideals and values. Inglehart & Norris (2003) also stress the importance of a culture of gender equality enabling women to move up the social ladder.

Professional occupations
The proportion of women working in a country and the type of occupations they hold also plays a role in the representation of women in parliament. Kenworthy & Malami (1999) and Salmond (2006) show that the share of women in certain socio-professional categories, such as lawyers, educators, journalists and business professionals, has an impact on their descriptive representation in national parliaments. Iversen & Rosenbluth (2008) show that the United States is an exceptional case in view of the low representation of women in Congress with regard to women's participation in the labor force and the egalitarian attitudes of citizens. They suggest that the political arena in the United States is similar to a labour market where seniority and uninterrupted careers are important.

Development
Krook (2010b) shows that the factors influencing the descriptive representation of women are not necessarily the same in industrialized countries as in developing countries. Citizens in developing countries may have more traditional cultural values defining the roles of women and men, in addition to facing different economic realities and political conditions than their more industrialized counterparts. Based on quantitative analysis, Stockmer (2014) shows that development itself is a factor in explaining the increase in the share of women parliamentarians. Some variables such as women's participation in the labor force do not have the same impact in developed and developing countries.

Corruption
Some studies have introduced new variables such as corruption that may influence the degree of women's representation in parliament (Stockemer, 2009, 2011). David Dollar et al (2001) show that the higher the number of women in a country's national parliament, the lower the level of corruption. However, the

causality of this relationship is under discussion, notably by Sung (2003) who gives an alternative explanation linked to democratic context.

Political representation of women in parliaments: critical mass, affiliations, interests, individual & socio-economic factors

What interests do women defend and why?

There is an accepted agreement in the literature that the gender of parliamentarians has influence on the laws that are passed or adopted. In general, female office-holders are more in favor of liberal and egalitarian laws in social policy than their male counterparts (Poggione 2004). For example, women leaders are relatively more in favor of affirmative action such as the introduction of gender quotas as shown by Wängnerud (2009). Analyzing the results from 159 developing countries, she finds a positive association between women's political representation and the adoption and implementation of laws that are sensitive to the unique needs of women. Grey (2002) found a positive correlation between the improvement of maternity leave laws in New Zealand between 1975 and 1999 and the increase in the percentage of women in parliament over the same period (from less than 5% to almost 30%).

Thomas (1991) shows that countries with the highest percentage of women legislators have passed more bills dealing with women, children and family issues than countries with lower female representation. Thomas (1991) also showed that women are more involved in passing these bills than male parliamentarians in these countries. Beaman et al (2012) demonstrate that the gender gap in educational attainment is more likely to narrow when there is greater equality between women and men in parliamentary representation.

Based on the results of a test of 415 students, Ranehill and Weber (2017) show that women, on average, favor more egalitarian policies than men. Reingold (2000) and Diaz (2005) illustrate that women parliamentarians tend to give priority to issues that are priorities for women voters. Most likely, this is due to the fact that women politicians take the representation of women's interests, and issues relating to their protection, into consideration more than male office-holders do (Thomas 1994). Celis (2006) found that female Belgian parliamentarians view themselves as special representatives for women. For Phillips (1995), the reason for women's predisposition to adopt legislation that advances women in society can be found in their daily life experience and how it differs from that of men; differences in child-rearing, division of labor, discrimination, violence and sexual harassment can explain a greater receptivity to these types of laws.

Links between descriptive and substantive representation

A general consensus that women's effective representation will impact parliaments exists, thus creating a link between descriptive and substantive representation. Nevertheless, debates as to the extent of this impact, and what

reasons may diminish the positive correlation between the two types of representation, continue. For Lovenduski (2005a), the culture of masculinity and gender bias in political institutions is a major obstacle.

Critical mass

The concept of critical mass defends the idea that descriptive representation of women only leads to substantive representation once a certain threshold has been reached. The figure of 30% is often cited as a threshold for the substantive representation of women. Grey (2006) prefers to suggest different thresholds depending on the result to be achieved: 15% may allow women politicians to change the political agenda, but 40% is necessary for policies that are friendly to women to be enacted. Jeydel and Taylor (2003) and Beckwith (2007) also show that numbers are not enough, since seniority in parliaments and institutional positioning can considerably increase the impact that legislators have. For some researchers, increasing female representation in parliaments has an impact on the political agenda but not necessarily on outcomes, such as Elgie's study (2008) in Rwanda, which demonstrates that while women's issues are more likely to be raised with an increase in the number of women parliamentarians, this increase has little effect on policy outcomes.

Others introduce variables such as party affiliation and party interests (Lawless 2005; Volden 2010). For Heidar & Pedersen (2006), gender differences in votes are only noticeable on issues that are not yet the focus of party concerns. As soon as parties take up an issue, party discipline forces women to support their party's positions (Yoon 2011). Political structures, such as proportional representation systems, gender quotas, party affiliations and more, may impact women's ability to pass laws that either remove barriers for women or advance their societal status.

Part 1: Identifying obstacles for women parliamentarians

In order to better understand the underlying dynamics behind the aforementioned variables and its relationship with legal frameworks aimed at reducing gender socioeconomic inequalities, a qualitative survey was conducted. The survey, distributed in the form of an online questionnaire, was designed to help discern what specific obstacles female parliamentarians may or may not experience while producing, passing or proposing legislation that 1) removes barriers preventing women from accessing equal socio-economic opportunities or 2) legislation that advances women's socio-economic standing in society.

The purpose of this analysis is to offer empirical insight and to set the stage for future areas of critical inquiry. The survey was carried out with balanced geographical representation and the participation of as large a number of parliamentarians as possible, thus allowing for a more accurate assessment of potential patterns in the survey responses. Additionally, increasing the amount of observations gathered encourages varied information. This affords a greater possibility to identify any significant differences in participant responses as well as similarities.

Another important justification for this exercise is that such an analysis could shed light on whether or not women parliamentarians from different countries and cultures experience similar obstacles. Furthermore, by diversifying the responses we aim to gather more intelligence on existing barriers that might not have been observed before.

Responses to these questions have the potential to offer greater understanding in several areas: 1) which dimensions of legislation women parliamentarians may dedicate more attention to, 2) their views on the impact of increasing the number of women in parliament and 3) what best practice recommendations may entail.

While we were able to gather specific, and important, insights from this analysis, with which to highlight crucial areas for future consideration, we cannot draw any conclusions about the status of women parliamentarians currently and by no means provide any general explanation to gender socioeconomic inequality

Survey respondent selection

First, geographical regions were determined according to the World Bank's standard breakdown: Africa (AFR), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and South Asia (SAR).

Each global region was included to encourage more expansive representation. Next, countries were identified according to two central criteria:

1. Whether or not they meet a 30% threshold of women in parliament. This particular characteristic, enshrined in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, was selected to divide countries into categories because 1) general consensus, both political and academic,[7] suggests it marks the beginning of the substantive representation of women in politics as a result of their increased presence, although debate remains, and 2) the database selected for this paper, the Inter-Parliamentary Union Women in Parliaments Statistical Archive, provides an explicit starting point from which to create categories.[8]
2. Using the Women, Business and Law Index, countries were categorized according to their overall WBL Index Score in conjunction with the percentage of women in their parliaments. In addition to ensuring as much geographic diversity as possible, we sought to identify a range of countries with both high and low WBL Index scores, as well as high and low percentages of women in parliament, to access a more representative picture of what challenges women parliamentarians face when passing, producing or proposing legislation that repairs socio-economic inequalities between men and women.

A selection of countries was made based on these categories to include diversified global representation and reach countries where female parliamentarians are active members of either the Women Political Leaders (WPL) Network or the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

A total of 21 women parliamentarians from the following countries responded to the survey: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Korea.

Questionnaire design
The survey was divided into three parts to encourage a systematic assessment of female parliamentarians' insights and experiences through the analysis of both close-ended and open-ended questions.

Closed-ended questions
The first portion of the survey includes closed-ended questions designed so that respondents must select one of a limited number of answers provided to them. These questions seek to identify obstacles that women parliamentarians might face when passing, proposing or producing legislation repairing gender-based

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[7]See Literature Review for further information.
[8]The database provides widespread descriptive statistics for 193 countries regarding the number of women in upper, lower and bicameral houses of parliament. For more information on the data selected for this paper, please visit the data annex.

socio-economic inequalities. More specifically, these queries address perceptions of female leadership and the potential impact of pre-existing legislation as barriers.

Open-ended questions
The open-ended questions allowed for a greater variety of responses, which could shed more light on individual experiences, regional differences, and what best practices, in the eyes of respondents, might help increase the number of women in parliament. They were designed to assess the existence of obstacles for women parliamentarians when introducing or passing legislation related to socio-economic inequalities between women and men. Additionally, these questions attempt to gain insight into the different barriers that are present for passing legislation that either reduces pre-existing socio-economic barriers for women or advances their socio-economic status in society.

Results
We sought to identify any potential patterns, similarities or differences in the 21 parliamentarians' responses to the qualitative survey. Commonalities could lead to a deeper understanding in terms of the challenges that women face both in parliament and when passing legislation that pertains to women's equality. Although we are unable to draw finite conclusions from this survey, we can highlight the existence of best practice examples based on the global collection of responses.

This article supports the notion that improving international development and advancing gender equality are related processes, as enshrined in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. Critical observationswill be utilized to develop a deeper understanding of what mechanisms could help address inequalities between women and men in parliaments. Additionally, these results may contribute to a greater understanding of which areas of development, or dimensions of legislation, are crucial to ensuring gender equality.

Scaling women parliamentarians' responses
The first part of the questionnaire consists of two close-ended questions, with answers distributed on an ordinal scale of 1-5, with 0 representing *no impact*; 1 representing *almost no impact*; 2 representing *minimal impact*; 3 representing *some impact*; 4 representing *substantial impact*; and 5 representing *great impact*.

Identifying obstacles: perceptions' impact on women's ability to enter parliament
The first query looks at the potential impact that perceptions of female leadership play on the proportion of women in parliament. Cultural and societal biases and stereotypes may have a significant impact on communities' views of women as leaders. According to the Reykjavik Index for Leadership (2019), which measures the perceptions that men and women have of women's suitability as leaders across

22 sectors in G7 and BRIC countries, none of these countries demonstrate equal representation in their parliaments and prejudice against women in political leadership positions is widespread. Inglehart and Norris (2003) also underscore the importance of a culture of gender equality for enabling women to access social mobility more generally. Consequently, perceptions and biases, conscious or unconscious, may affect women's ability to enter into parliament and to increase the percentage of women in parliament.

Perceptions of Female Leadership

As Figure 1 demonstrates, of the 21 respondents, 33% answered that perceptions of female leadership have "great" impact on the number of women in their countries' parliaments. 33% also noted that perceptions have a "substantial" impact on entering parliament. None of the respondents concluded that perceptions of women as leaders has no impact on the percentage of women in parliament. In fact, 86% of survey participants cite perceptions as having some impact (responses that scored a 3, 4 or 5).

Identifying obstacles: pre-existing legislation's effect on passing legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women
The second question aims to determine whether or not women parliamentarians believe that pre-existing legislation affects the ability of parliament to pass legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women or advances their economic status in society. In coordination with the open-ended questions, this inquiry will allow us to observe the potential existence of a vicious or virtuous cycle regarding the capacity of parliament to pass said legislation.

Pre-Existing Legislation

According to Figure 2, of the 21 respondents, 38% say that pre-existing legal frameworks have a "great" impact on the ability of parliament to successfully pass legislation that provides equal access to socio-economic opportunities between women and men. 33% indicate that pre-existing legal frameworks have "some" or "substantial" (3 and 4) impact on the ability of parliament to successfully pass legislation removing barriers to women's socio-economic status. 29% of responses convey that pre-existing laws present minimal, almost no impact or no impact (2,1,0).

Conclusion

The analysis of the first part of the survey highlights several critical points: first, perceptions of female leadership may have a powerful impact on women's ability to access political leadership positions, such as entering parliaments. It is notable that a majority of respondents cited perceptions as having at least some impact on the number of women in parliament, if not more. This could be interpreted as a significant observation because it suggests that these women parliamentarians view perceptions as an area that requires more focus.

The set of responses to the second question also offers important insight into pre-existing barriers that may hinder the passing of legislation that reduces socio-economic obstacles for women. 12 respondents, or 57%, acknowledge that pre-existing legislation has "great" or "substantial" impact on the ability of parliamentarians to pass legislation that removes these types of barriers for women.

Identifying obstacles to entering parliament: women parliamentarians share their insights

As demonstrated by the first section of the study, political representation is both a democratic imperative and essential to improving women's socio-economic status (Horowitz 2009). The first portion of the open-ended questions asked women parliamentarians to identify the obstacles they face when entering parliament. Their responses shed light on measures that can be implemented to bypass these obstacles. The parliamentarians' answers also allow us to identify some of the main factors leading to the underrepresentation of women in parliament.

When asked to identify central obstacles to proposing, passing or introducing legislation that provides equal access to socio-economic opportunities for women and men, several key themes emerged in women parliamentarians' responses: the importance of values, culture, and the need for more comprehensive affirmative action measures.

These answers are significant because parliamentarians across regions produced similar responses, in addition to underscoring similar issues, while 1) having no identifiable personal connection and 2) living in different countries and geographical areas. Additionally, among those interviewed, we were able to recognize common obstacles despite differing locations, political systems, ages and positions within parliament.

When asking women parliamentarians about what they perceive as the main obstacles to entering parliament, we were able to identify 3 fundamental categories of barriers: 1) barriers involving political and electoral systems, 2) structural and socio-economic barriers, and 3) cultural and ideological barriers, which, as reflected by the first part of the qualitative analysis, 86% of respondents believe have a noticeable impact on the number of women in their countries' parliaments. This also confirms Horowitz's argument that "the supply of female candidates is determined by women's structural access to opportunities, and political and cultural demand for female representation" (Horowitz 2009).

Identifying obstacles: political and electoral system
Quotas

When discussing possible measures to increase the descriptive representation of women in parliament, almost 60% of the interviewed parliamentarians acknowledged gender quotas as a measure to boost women's political participation. This would seem to confirm the existing literature documenting quotas' powerful positive impact on women's legislative representation (Williams 2015).

The results of the survey responses have highlighted two types of quotas: candidate quotas and reserved seats. Candidate quotas consist of nominating a minimum percentage of women candidates for election and applying these candidates to political parties' lists. They may also require other measures, such as the placement of women in certain positions. Candidate quotas can be compulsory or voluntary (Williams 2015). Reserved-seat quotas consist of reserving a certain portion of legislative seats for female legislators. The advantage of reserved-seat quotas is that they make a certain level of women's participation compulsory in the legislative process (Williams 2015).

A majority of the interviewed parliamentarians agree that a stringent quota system advances women's representation in parliament, in addition to tackling obstacles related to women's political representation. However, their responses also suggest that quotas systems are not strong enough on their own to affect change - they should be institutionalized to a higher degree.

In fact, some of the respondents agreed that having compulsory quotas enshrined in the law at the constitutional level will yield more significant results than relying solely on voluntary quota systems. A compulsory quota would set a mandatory threshold of the percentage of women required to appear on the electoral lists, thus increasing the proportion of female candidates in the legislative powers of government. Williams and Thames elaborate on this logic by claiming that "compulsory party and reserved- seat quotas can have a much broader impact on women's representation than voluntary party quotas because of their broader scope" (Williams 2015). In the scope of the open-ended questions parliamentarians seemed to agree that taking more aggressive affirmative action measures, such as reserved seat quotas, would complement compulsory party quotas.

The survey responses seem to confirm the argument that reserved-seat quotas are more effective in guaranteeing women's meaningful political inclusion. According to the literature on the subject, reserved-seat quotas provide greater opportunities for women's participation in the legislative process because they require the reservation of a certain portion of seats for female legislators. Meanwhile, candidate quotas only increase the chance that women will be elected (Meier 2000) (Williams 2015). Reserved-seat quotas also demand that women parliamentarians leaving office be replaced by other women thus maintaining a minimum level of female representation inside parliaments.[9] These arguments are mirrored by the exceptional case of women's parliamentary representation in Rwanda, which is in part due to the preservation of reserved-seat quotas in the 2003 Constitution: Article 9 demands that at least 30% of the seats in decision-making organs must be occupied by a woman (Elgie 2008). After implementing these measures, Rwanda observed an increase from 25.7% of women in the

[9]Here it is also important to note that the effectiveness of legislated candidate list quotas is significantly higher when supported by regulatory mechanisms or sanctions, for example, the rejection of lists that do not abide by the quota requirement. See the cases of Bolivia and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Women, Business and the Law Report 2016, p.11

Chamber of Deputies to 48.75% after the 2003 elections. This catapulted Rwanda to obtaining the highest percentage of women Members of Parliament in the world, which it still has to this day (Elgie 2008).

A final important issue brought up by the interviewed parliamentarians is the recurrence of quotas at all levels. Indeed, two mentioned the importance of having compulsory quotas in every election applied to all political parties. This strict measure would strengthen women's representation not only at the federal level, but also at local and state levels, consequently ensuring a more generalized inclusion of women in the political life of the countries.

Political parties

While quotas are a proven mechanism to increase women's political representation, they are not sufficient according to some of the interviewed women parliamentarians. Quotas would seem to have a greater impact when combined with substantial electoral and political party reform. Zetterberg and Bjarnegard explain that "a growing body of research on the impact of compulsory quotas has shown that these quota laws may, but do not necessarily, increase the number of female legislators. One reason why even legally adopted quotas are not always effective is that political parties charged with their implementation do not comply with the quota requirements" (Zetterberg 2016).

This is because political parties often act as the gatekeepers of political inclusion. Candidate selection often operates through the parties themselves, thus the gender dynamics inside political parties are extremely important to consider when increasing women's representation in parliament (Horowitz 2009). Therefore, in countries where political parties represent the basis for political life, it is essential to bolster the inclusion of women inside parties to ensure their widespread political representation (Horowitz 2009). An identified pattern in survey responses suggests that in countries with strong party systems, affirmative electoral action must be taken, such as installing quotas inside all political parties, and be an object of legal sanction (Zetterberg 2016).

Additionally, some respondents mentioned the need to have affirmative action measures that go beyond quotas. For example, economic incentives that encourage a greater participation of women inside political parties. Parliamentarians also recommend that political parties ensure 1) the nomination of women to positions of power inside and outside the party, like appointing members of the cabinet, and 2) reflect women's perspectives within party agendas. Also, parliamentarians indicated that political parties should improve their modus operandi to include more women. More specifically, two of the interviewed Members of Parliament underlined the importance of implementing a mandatory alternate order in electoral lists, alongside quotas, to promote equal opportunities between men and women.

Finally, one of the respondents underscored the importance the electoral system has on the descriptive representation of women. She highlighted the need for proportional representation in order to increase the number and influence of women in politics. The logic behind this argument has been widely studied by researchers: Horowitz stipulates that "female politicians are elected in much greater numbers under proportional representation systems where voters choose among closed party lists in multimember districts rather than individual candidates in single member districts" (2009). This may be due to the fact that the nature of majoritarian elections, as opposed to proportional representation systems, follows a zero-sum game that creates incentive for parties to nominate men who they feel are the safest candidates (Horowitz 2009).

As a result, the representation of women in parliament would seem to depend on a multitude of factors related to institutional constructions of electoral and party systems inside democracies. To this end, many affirmative measures can be implemented, such as compulsory candidate quotas, reserved seats, legal sanctions, financial incentives and alternate order in electoral lists.

It is important to note, however, that the need for these kinds of affirmative-action measures may mirror structural gender-based inequalities in society that affect women's descriptive representation in parliaments. Indeed, some parliamentarians mentioned several factors related to development issues that play a role in the political representation of women.

Identifying obstacles: existing inequalities and structural conditions
Economic inequalities
Two of the interviewed women parliamentarians spoke both directly and indirectly about the impact that gender-based financial inequalities have on women's descriptive representation in parliaments. This perspective is also supported by the results of the first part of the qualitative analysis, which suggests that the women parliamentarians participating in the survey focus strongly on workplace and parenthood legislation, both of which are related to the socio-economic empowerment of women.

According to the literature, the "feminization" of poverty is a significant barrier to increasing the political representation of women in parliament (Shvedova 2005). Along the lines of Shvedova's argument, the interviewed parliamentarians discussed taking affirmative action measures which provide women with financial resources like campaign financing or, alternatively, limiting the amount of money candidates can spend during their campaign. These measures would help to ensure financial equality between women and men when running for political office, while consequently responding to the structural "feminization" of poverty.

Another factor mentioned in the survey responses is the "dual burden of women," as coined by Shvedova (2005). The author acknowledges that in most countries women are responsible for a disproportionate share of domestic work. This

presents a difficult barrier for some women to overcome as they would be compelled to meet the basic needs of their families and consequently have little to contribute actively to political life (Shvedova 2005). Three Members of Parliament confirmed this sentiment in their survey responses: one mentioned the importance of having a good balance between work and family life, while another underscored the importance of successful parenting and family life to allow for more freedom in the workplace. The last response underlined the importance of educating women to help empower them to achieve their own purpose in life. In this context, the responses seem to reaffirm that family life and social expectations are an important factor in determining women's representation in parliament.

Education

Additionally, three interviewed parliamentarians brought up the link between education and women's political representation in parliament in their responses. Despite the fact that "no study that includes measures of women's educational attainment as a predictor of female presence in national legislatures found it to have a significant effect" (Horowitz 2009), some qualitative research, and the results of this survey, would seem to highlight education as an important factor for women's increased presence in politics.

As Shvedova points out, "many candidacy nomination procedures require a minimum level of literacy. This prevents women from registering as candidates for elections" (2005). In addition, a certain level of political training is essential for women to participate in the political arena (Shvedova 2005). The results of the survey mirror these insights as women parliamentarians cited national education, education curriculums and the educational empowerment of women as essential to advancing women's participation in politics.

These arguments, which take into account the structural conditions affecting women's political inclusion in parliament, also seem to reflect the underlying assumption that the Sustainable Development Goals are interrelated. This implies that Goals 8 (Inclusive Growth) and 4 (Education) are intricately linked to the attainment of Goal 5 (gender equality). In this context, the inclusion of women in parliament would seem to depend on several structural factors in addition to the political system itself. Therefore it seems that increasing the number of women in parliament constitutes an issue of development that can be achieved by working on education and economic equality.

Identifying obstacles: cultural and ideological perceptions
Culture, values and social factors

The third category of barriers identified by the survey participants relates to socio-cultural perceptions of female leadership and the perceived political capacity of women. Horowitz's research confirms the importance of perceptions, claiming that "the way in which the general public imagines women's capabilities and opportunities matters to their political inclusion" (2009).

According to the literature, cultural narratives denote a particular image of the role women should play in public life. In many countries, this role is highly apolitical and restricts women to labels such as "working mothers" or "housewives." These assumptions lead to a discrepancy between women's expected roles and the anticipated requirements of a political leader (Horowitz 2009) (Shvedova 2005). The literature affirms that these perceptions affect, depending on the country, both the electorate and the parties themselves, thus leading to an underrepresentation of women in politics (Horowitz 2009). While not a globally inclusive picture, this point is also reinforced by the findings of the Reykjavik Index for Leadership whose cross-country survey of 22,000 men and women in G7 and BRIC countries cites vast discrepancies in how women and men perceive women's capabilities to lead (2019).

Not surprisingly, when parliamentarians were asked to identify some of the main obstacles to women's entry in parliament, some referred to the perception that men are more capable politicians than women, especially regarding "hard policy" subjects such as national security. In this context, the interviewed parliamentarians emphasized the critical role that both feminist movements and movements advocating women's rights may play in increasing descriptive representation by challenging cultural and social perceptions. Indeed, such movements may provide a space to dispute traditional gender roles and make it more costly for political parties to exclude women from their electoral lists (Hubbard 2020).

Additionally, some surveyed parliamentarians highlighted the importance, directly or indirectly, of changing not only male's perceptions of female leadership, but also altering how women perceive themselves. Some researchers attribute a lack of confidence, resulting from perceptions that women may have of themselves, as one of the central reasons for the underrepresentation of women in politics (Shvedova 2005). Interviewed parliamentarians also stressed the need for women to continue demanding greater rights. In addition, they underscored the importance of solidarity by encouraging other women to stand up for their political rights and suggesting that women leaders should empower other women to define their own roles and careers.

Identifying obstacles to passing legislation for removing barriers and advancing rights for women

Two of the open-ended questions were designed to identify the main obstacles that women parliamentarians face when trying to pass legislation that removes barriers for women by increasing their socio-economic inclusion. The answers to these questions allow us to identify obstacles inside the legislative branch that may prevent women from achieving equality, in addition to illustrating some of the obstacles that women parliamentarians face in their daily work lives.

Some of the responses reveal the following obstacles to passing and/or introducing legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women: perceptions, a predominantly masculine culture in parliaments and party systems, lack of political

will, connection to the executive power, a lack of awareness and training in comparison to male counterparts, the underrepresentation of women in parliament, and a lack of previous gender inclusive legislation.

Increased descriptive representation of women

An important factor to passing legislation that improves women's socio-economic rights is the increased representation of women in parliament. Survey responses pointed out that a low proportion of women representatives in some parliaments has an effect on the passing of this type of legislation. This insight is confirmed by previous research as Karam and Lovenduski state that "the extent of women's impact will depend very much on the number of women in parliament who are motivated to represent women's issues and concerns" (Lovenduski 2005). This may be attributed to the fact that women's presence in parliament, even in small numbers, affects the behavior of male legislators. Nevertheless, Karam and Lovenduski argue that long term change also comes as a result of a substantial number of women in parliament who are willing to represent concerns specific to women (Lovenduski 2005).

As we will see in the following section, the argument delineating the positive impact of descriptive representation on laws that remove barriers for women will be also supported by the statistical model of this article. Indeed, the study will seek to advance a positive correlation between the percentage of women in single and lower houses of parliament and the quality of legal frameworks and regulations that advance socio-economic access to opportunities for women. However, Lovenduski and Karam reaffirm that "change does not simply result from numbers; rather it is a complex process of overcoming resistance to women in which presence is only one part of the necessary mixture" (Lovenduski 2005). Furthermore, other factors pointed out in survey responses seem to confirm that the impact women parliamentarians may have on passing gender equal laws also depends on other factors both inside and outside of parliament.

Party systems, lobbying practices and a lack of political will

According to the response results, political parties seem to present a substantial obstacle for passing legislation that removes structural barriers for women. Almost 20% of the interviewed parliamentarians agreed on the importance of political parties when passing legislation that reduces socio-economic obstacles for women. This phenomenon could be explained by lobbying and whipping practices, a party's political agenda or a lack of political will coming from within the party.

To this end, research shows the existence of a significant political imbalance between men and women inside parties. Women continue to be underrepresented in leadership and decision-making positions inside political parties. This leads to a lack of political incentive, or will, in which male members

have little interest in addressing inequalities. Therefore, women struggle to mobilize ideas that differ from leading partisan goals (Hubbard 2020).

In addition to this, when women parliamentarians were asked to identify the existence of obstacles in passing or introducing legislation that advances women's socio-economic inclusion in society, many spoke about whipping practices and parties' political agendas. The responses demonstrate that party agendas often have other priorities and objectives. Research has shown that the nomination of women is often related to a party's agenda, which is determined by the political environment of the nomination (Funk 2017). An article written by Funk et al. shows that in Latin American countries parties nominate more women when faced with a certain distrust from voters, while when parties face many competitors they are less likely to nominate women (2017).

This phenomenon is exacerbated by whipping and lobbying systems. Whipping prevents parliamentarians from voting as individuals, thus the pressure to adhere to predetermined party agendas, and lobbying, allow external actors to influence party agendas. Two interviewed Members of Parliament acknowledged that financial institutions, lobbying groups and ministries often possess more influence and access in orienting the political agenda than parliamentarians do. An example developed during the survey was the case of maternity leave: some interviewed MPs labeled it as a difficult issue in parliamentary discussions because employers find this issue difficult to manage and therefore put pressure on the decision-making processes. As a result, the capacity of women parliamentarians to influence the party's political agenda may be undermined.

Male culture and external & internal perceptions
Another issue raised by women parliamentarians participating in the survey regards the culture both inside and outside of parliament. Parliamentarians identify a predominantly masculine culture inside parliament, which, in turn, shapes legislative processes and agendas. Upon entering parliament women step into "a male domain" that was "established, organized and dominated by men acting in their own interest and establishing procedures for their own convenience" (Lovenduski 2005).

Interviewed parliamentarians described parliament as a male-dominated organization, which leads to the patronization of female parliamentarians and their exclusion from areas of discussion that are perceived as masculine. Indeed, when asked about obstacles to passing and introducing laws that advance the socio-economic status of women, more than 25% of respondents cited a lack of will from male colleagues to pass these types of laws due to a patriarchal culture within parliament.

Additionally, at least three parliamentarians referred directly to the lack of proper training for women upon entering parliament as a significant obstacle. This may reinforce the power held by older, male legislators who know the system better

and are sometimes reluctant to place women in higher leadership positions (Shvedova 2005). Also, answers affirm that this type of organizational culture may entail excluding women from certain "hard policy" topics, such as national defense and finance.

In addition, cultural and religious values, as well as the perception of gender roles, were mentioned as significant barriers for women to pass laws that aim to improve women's socio-economic opportunities. Some of the interviewed parliamentarians acknowledged that cultural and religious backgrounds may affect the way both female and male parliamentarians vote. These perceptions can influence the passing of regulations that advance women's rights in different ways. First, certain systemic values shape societal perceptions. These perceptions are therefore ingrained in voters' mindsets and difficult to change. At least four members of parliament referred, directly or indirectly, to patriarchal traditional values as an obstacle to passing legislation that removes barriers for women. Secondly, perceptions may also influence the way women perceive themselves as politicians. This can lead to a lack of confidence on the part of some women legislators (Shvedova 2005). Indeed, according to the survey responses, fear of criticism is an obstacle to both entering parliament and passing legislation that increases gender equality.

Previous existing legislation and the executive connection
Finally, an issue that several women parliamentarians raise when relaying obstacles to passing legislation that advances women's socio-economic access to opportunity is the existence of previous legislation delineating the political and economic inclusion of women. One parliamentarian points out that laws can change not only perceptions, but behavior as well.

According to survey responses, this would be the case regarding rules related to family life, entrepreneurship, finance and inheritance. Indeed, some research underscores that laws and policies play an important role in shaping women's economic agency (Htun 2019). Studies have also found that women's increased social and economic agency alters norms regarding women's behavior and political participation (Htun 2019). Consequently, existing legal frameworks that advance women's socio-economic rights may boost the political inclusion of women and facilitate further production of this kind of legislation, thus reaffirming the results of this survey.

However, some of the women parliamentarians participating in the survey note that even when legislation is adequate the problem lies in the application of the law. Indeed, Annesley and Gains argue that "the gendered disposition of the core executive both facilitates and constrains the capacity of committed feminist policy actors – ministers and bureaucrats – to gender policy outcomes" (Gains 2010). This point illustrates that the connection between the executive and the legislative also plays an important role in advancing equal rights.

Identifying obstacles: introducing versus passing legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women

As the results of prior open-ended questions demonstrate, some of the interviewed women parliamentarians believe that their countries' political parties and systems play a significant role in determining the outcome of not only the number of women in parliament, but also the presence of legal frameworks that repair gender-based socio-economic inequalities. This can in part be attributed to the notion that political parties are often viewed as gatekeepers for women's inclusion in politics. As previously mentioned, Horowitz cites the party candidate selection process as a deciding factor in the gender make-up of certain political parties (2009). This process can be determinative in countries where political parties represent the foundation of political life. It is therefore key to boost the inclusion of women in political parties to ensure greater representation of women's interests (Horowitz 2009).

In this context, when asked if barriers for introducing legislation that reduces pre-existing socio-economic obstacles for women differ from the passing of said legislation, some of the parliamentarians cited political party agendas and internal politics as highly influential in determining which bills are introduced and which are passed. In fact, eight parliamentarians, both directly and indirectly, mentioned internal party dynamics as a deciding factor of how difficult both introducing and passing legislation related to gender inequality may be.

Here it is important to note that national differences in political systems and within parliaments play a critical role in deciphering the obstacles to both passing and introducing the aforementioned legal frameworks. For example, one parliamentarian noted that administrative bodies are unable to submit their own bills because it is difficult to reach consensus among the relevant ministries. Therefore, ministries deliver their propositions to invested parliamentary committees, who are then responsible for introducing and passing said legislation. Disagreement may ensue between parliamentary committees because they may be representing the vested interests of the ministries.

Even if female ministers are able to propose legislation specific to women's socio-economic rights to a predominantly female parliamentary committee, their proposals may not experience equal treatment. According to Yoder's assessment of tokenism in the workplace, it is sexism -- not the size of the group of people-- that determines inequities (1991). Her research suggests that highly masculinized occupations, such as politics, become more resistant to increasing numbers of women rather than less.

Another interviewed parliamentarian mentioned that the obstacles will depend on the ruling political party: if cabinet bills are introduced, they can bypass the majority with support of the ruling party, whereas member bills may never even be discussed because they require approval from both the ruling and opposition

parties. Furthermore, one female parliamentarian specifically pointed out that political party structures and strategists greatly influence what bills are able to make a "short list" and which will never be introduced.

Kathlene's study on the interaction of gender and position in American politics examines if an increased presence of women in state legislatures may lead to greater influence in policymaking. Her findings suggest that "despite their numerical or political gains, (women) may be seriously disadvantaged in committee hearings and unable to participate equally…. These findings are not actually surprising given our culture and the social construction of male power" (1994).

Along these lines, some of the women parliamentarians interviewed said that it is the subject of the legislation that determines the obstacles more so than the action of introducing or passing legislation. Four parliamentarians asserted that if the legislation is specific to women's rights it will be met with opposition from either their male counterparts or pervasive patriarchal biases.

Finally, some of the parliamentarians indicated that there is no difference between obstacles in introducing legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women versus obstacles in passing it.

Consequently, the obstacles that women parliamentarians seem to face in introducing versus passing legislation that reduces socio-economic barriers for women would seem to rely on differences in parliamentary systems and political party structures. While some similarities can be identified in parliamentarians' responses, such as the existence of male resistance to legislation that speaks specifically to improving women's status, discrepancies present in particular national party systems seem to determine the existence of unique obstacles.

Part 2: Measuring the relationship between legislation and the percentage of women in parliament: A cross-country numerical approach

Studying whether or not the proportion of women in parliament impacts the extent to which parliaments, and individual representatives, take women's interests into consideration when drafting legislation is a complex debate. Demonstrating the existence of such a connection would require identifying factors related to 1) the behavior of female parliamentarians, 2) policy congruence with female voters' preferences, 3) understanding women parliamentarians' intentionality when drafting legislation[10], and 4) considering the intersecting

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[10]Indeed, the meaning of substantive representation might refer to the connection between represented parties and single legislators or the relationship between citizens and whole legislatures (Kroeber, 2018).

components of a person's identity – such as race, class, and ability status – in an attempt to correctly capture their lived experiences (Crenshaw 1989).

Nevertheless, this article introduces a new approach to evaluate the aforementioned relationship: instead of studying inputs -- i.e. how women parliamentarians may represent the interests and preferences of the electorate-- this paper analyses outputs: does greater female representation in parliament correlate to legislation that either reduces socio-economic barriers for women or advances their socio-economic status in society?

In the first part of the study, the reviewed literature as well as the analysis of the survey seemed to point out that increased female presence in parliament can lead to passing legislation aimed at increasing gender socioeconomic equality, in spite of the many obstacles women face when passing these laws or entering parliament. In addition, several respondents mentioned developmental components, such as education or income, as important factors of women increased descriptive representation in the legislative branch.

This article will seek to corroborate these insights by searching for an existing positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the quality of legal frameworks in granting equal access to socio-economic opportunities to women globally, through the use of statistical data.

Consequently, the following analysis aims to show that an increased presence of female representation in parliament is positively associated with gender equal socio-economic policies and the afore mentioned developmental factors. This paper will contribute to the literature by providing a cross-country measurement on the effect that women in parliament have on the existence of such legislation.

Constructing a simple linear regression model

We first deployed an ordinary least squares (OLS) simple regression to identify the existence of a correlation between the percentage of women in parliaments and the quality of legal frameworks that advance women's socio-economic status in society.

Measuring the percentage of women in parliament: IPU data

The proportion of women in parliaments serves as the explanatory variable in the following model. The model seeks to explain the quality of legal frameworks in advancing socio-economic opportunities for women in terms of the proportion of women in parliament. Data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Women in National Parliaments Statistical Archive, as recorded in February 2019, was employed. This was the most up-to-date information available at the time of writing.[11] This archive includes information regarding the percentage of women

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[11]With time constraints taken into consideration, cross-sectional data proved sufficient for this analysis because the primary objective is to search for the existence of a positive statistical

represented in lower or single houses of parliament in 193 different countries. The proportion of women in lower houses or single houses was utilized in order not to exclude countries with a unicameral system.

Measuring legal frameworks: Women, Business and the Law Index

To measure the quality of legislation that reduces structural access to socio-economic opportunities for women, the Women Business and the Law (WBL) Index was used. This index is a reliable indicator of the status of legal frameworks that affect women's economic rights and inclusion.

The Women, Business and the Law Index measures the legal differences between men's and women's access to socio-economic opportunities in 190 economies. Thirty-five aspects of the law are scored across eight indicators including four or five binary questions. Each indicator represents a different aspect of a woman's career.[12] The data is updated based on feedback from respondents with expertise in family, labor and criminal law. Overall scores are calculated by taking the average of each indicator, with 100 representing the highest possible score.[13] In other words, if a country scores 100 this means that total legal equality between women and men in terms of access to socio-economic opportunity exists. The index covers 8 dimensions: mobility, workplace, pay, marriage, parenthood, entrepreneurship, assets and pensions.[14] In order to maintain coherence with the IPU data, this study employs countries' aggregated score from 2019 in the regression model.

Defining the number of countries

We were able to obtain data that included both WBL Index Score and the percentage of women in the single or lower chamber of parliament for 185 different countries.[15]

Defining the variables

Because this report seeks to identify a correlation between women's representation in parliament and the quality of legislation that advances socio-economic equality between women and men, we can define our explanatory variable as the percentage of women in lower or single houses of national parliaments and our dependent variable as a country's WBL Index Score.

Results	

relationship between the percentage of women in parliaments and an increase in the overall WBL Index score.

[12] The methodology was designed to be an easily replicable measure of the legal environment women experience as entrepreneurs and employees. Indicator-level scores are obtained by calculating the unweighted average of the questions within that indicator and scaling the result to 100.

[13] This is what we will refer to as the "WBL Index Score" throughout the remainder of the article.

[14] For specific information detailing the areas of legislation covered by each of the eight indicators please see the Women, Business and Law Index 2020.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32639/9781464815324.pdf

[15] The WBL Index covers 190 economies and the IPU database covers 193 countries. When combining the data for the present analysis, only 185 countries provided the necessary data from both sources. For more information, see data annex.

Observations 185 R Square 0.2240	
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Percentage of Women in Parliament	70.9642 P-Value (0.000)

Table 1

The p-values of the regression parameters are less than 0.01, suggesting that the percentage of women in parliament is a significant variable when it comes to explaining changes in the WBL Index Score. Additionally, the positive slope parameter implies a positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the WBL Index Score. In other words, all else equal, as the number of women in parliament increases, so does the presence of legal frameworks that reduce socio-economic barriers for women or advance their socio-economic status in society.[16]

Conclusion

The purpose of this quantitative analysis was to identify, and better understand, the positive relationship found between the proportion of women in parliament and the quality of legal frameworks that reduce socio-economic barriers for women or advance their status in society in 185 countries.

To accomplish this, a simple linear regression model was constructed: it employed the percentage of women in lower or single houses of parliament as the explanatory variable and the WBL Index Score, which measures the presence of gender equal economic laws and regulations in 190 economies, as the dependent variable.

The model found a positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the WBL Index. This means that increases in the proportion of women in parliament are correlated to increases in the aggregated WBL Index Score, and thus associated to an improvement in existing socio-economic legal frameworks that reduce barriers to access for women.

Is development related to gender equality in parliament? Inclusion of the Human Development Index (HDI)

Both achieving greater political representation of women in parliament and advancing gender equality within national legal frameworks are part and parcel of the international development agenda, as enshrined in Sustainable Development

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[16] Note on the coefficient of significance:

The R2 value is 0.22. This indicates that changes in the percentage of women in parliament may explain 22% of the average changes in the WBL Index Score. While this result might seem low to some, Falk and Miller (1992) deem an R2 that is greater than or equal to 0.10 adequate.

Of course, in the context of improving legal frameworks, many different variables could affect the production of socio-economic legislation that provides greater access to opportunity for women. Therefore, identifying a single variable that can explain 22% of the average changes in the overall WBL Index Score is indeed consequential.

Goal (SDG) 5. According to the United Nations, the challenges that individual countries confront on the road to gender equality are diverse and may vary according to the level of development.[17] This line of thought inspired the following inquiry: does the strength of the relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the WBL Index Score vary according to pre-existing development levels?

Measuring development: The Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) was created in response to traditional economic assumptions of development. It was designed to emphasize that human beings and their unique capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing development, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be utilized to compare national policy choices: how can two countries with the same level of GNI per capita end up with different human development outcomes? These contrasts can stimulate debate surrounding government policy priorities.

The Human Development Index (HDI)[18] is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development, including a long and healthy life (health), knowledgeability (education) and a decent standard of living.

Health is assessed by life expectancy at birth. Meanwhile education is measured by the mean years of schooling for adults aged 25 years or more as well as the expected years of schooling for children who are entering school. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita.[19] The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then combined into a composite index using the geometric mean. It is important to note, however, that the HDI captures only a part of what human development entails: it does not reflect inequalities, poverty, human security, etc.

In order to incorporate national levels of development into our analysis, the Human Development Index was selected for two key reasons: 1) it is a multidimensional index that includes the measurement of numerous aspects of development, namely health and education, rather than the level of income per capita alone and 2) data is available for almost every country included in our initial database, barring San Marino and Somalia. This allows us to analyze a total of 183 countries.[20]

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[17]Please see the Universal Sustainable Development Goals : Understanding the Transformational Challenge for Developed Countries, Report of a Study by Stakeholder Forum for more information: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=1684&menu=1515

[18] The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of these three dimensions.

[19]The HDI uses a logarithm of income to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI.

[20]The data employed below corresponds to the 2019 Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which uses data from 2018.

The data can be downloaded in Human Development Index 2019, Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi. It could be argued that using data from 2018 demonstrates a lack of rigor since all the other variables were measured in 2019. However,

Including the HDI in the regression model

When including the HDI inside a multiple linear regression, where the WBL Index score is the dependent variable, the Percentage of Women in Parliament and the Aggregated HDI are the explanatory variables; the results were the following:

Results	
Observations Adjusted R Square	183 0.3361
Statistic F	47.066 P-Value (0.000)
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Percentage of Women in Parliament	59.3358 P-Value (0.000)
HDI	40.6447 P-Value (0.000)

Table 2

Since both coefficients are positive and their p-values are less than 0.01, these results imply a positive correlation between the percentage of women in parliament, the WBL Index Score and the level of development as measured by the Human Development Index.

Possible insights

The political representation of women and the level of a country's development are correlated and could be complementary as pointed out in the first part of the article. If this is the case, in order to advance women's political representation, and their potential impact on legislation that increases gender equality, it is imperative to focus on other areas of development such as education and economic growth.

This would seem to provide support for the underlying thesis that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are inextricably linked. More specifically, it would suggest that advancements toward achieving SDG 5 (Gender Equality) are linked to improvements in SDGs 3 (Good-Health and Wellbeing), 4 (Quality Education) and 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth).

How do identifying factors of development play a role in gender equality?

The former part of the analysis demonstrates that a country's WBL Index score is correlated with the level of development, as measured by the Human Development Index, and the proportion of women in parliament. The main objective of the following section is thus to identify which dimensions of the HDI may have a stronger relationship with the other variables. This would strengthen

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for the HDI, the latest data available comes from 2018 and, as past reports show, its values for HDI do not vary much from one year to another.

the analysis, in addition to exposing some factors that could serve as a basis for policy insights.

Constructing the analysis

In order to pinpoint which variable affects the relationship between the proportion of women in parliament and the quality of legislation that removes socio-economic barriers for women most, we constructed a multiple linear regression. This equation incorporates the HDI dimensions (Health, Education and Growth) into our simple regression model, where the data is available for 183 countries. These dimensions correspond to the variables 1) life expectancy, 2) mean years of education, 3) expected years of schooling and 4) gross national product per capita (GNI).

This regression may provide further insight as to which variable, combined with the percentage of women in parliament, increases the strength of the relationship with the WBL Index Score.

Determining the order of the variables

To define the order that the variables should take inside of the regression, we must determine the correlation coefficient between each one of the five variables and the WBL Index. The order will depend on the value of this coefficient; the variable with the highest coefficient will be introduced first into the regression and so on (Gujarati 2009).

	Correlation Coefficient	Order
% Women in Parliament	0.473326258	2
Life expectancy	0.400865956	4
Expected years	0.516194121	1
Mean years	0.468496404	3

GNI	0.198292054	5

Table 3

First variable results: expected years of schooling

Results	
Observations	183
R Square	0.2624
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Expected Years of Schooling	3.0513 P-Value (0.000)

Table 4

According to the results of the regression, "expected years of schooling" represents a significant variable. The p-values of the parameters are less than 0.01 and the R2=0.26. This level of significance is relatively strong in comparison to the model employed in the first part of the quantitative analysis.

Introducing the percentage of women in parliament

Results	
Observations	183
Adjusted R Square	0.3723
Statistic F	54.9640 P-Value (0.000)
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Expected Years of Schooling	2.4110 P-Value (0.000)
Percentage of Women in Parliament	52.5345 P-Value (0.000)

Table 5

According to the results, "the percentage of women in parliament" and "expected years of schooling" are significant since the p-values of the parameters are less than 0.01 and the p-value for F is also less than 0.01. We witness an increase of the adjusted R2 value by approximately 0.11. This increase suggests that the inclusion of the percentage of women in parliament into the model is of substantial added value.

Introducing mean years of education

Results	
Observations	183
Adjusted R Square	0.3861
Statistic F	39.1601
	P-Value (0.000)
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Expected Years of Schooling	1.291
	P-Value (0.037)
Percentage of Women in Parliament	55.3146
	P-Value (0.000)
Mean Years of Schooling	1.289
	P-Value (0.026)

Table 6

In this model all variables are still significant as the p-values for their parameters, and the p-value for F, are less than 0.05. However, in the former model the level of confidence was higher (P-Values<0.01) and the marginal increase in the adjusted R2 value is relatively low at approximately 0.014.

Introducing Life Expectancy

Results	
Observations	183
Adjusted R Square	0.3854
Statistic F	29.527
	P-Value (0.000)
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Expected Years of Schooling	1.5533
	P-Value (0.024)
Percentage of Women in Parliament	55.4597
	P-Value (0.000)
Mean Years of Schooling	1.472
	P-Value (0.018)
Life Expectancy at Birth	-0.2113
	P-Value (0.38)

Table 7

The regression has shown that "life expectancy at birth" is not a significant variable since the p-value for its parameter is greater than 0.05. This signifies that there is not enough evidence to prove that an increase in life expectancy might be able to explain an increase in a country's WBL Index Score. Consequently, we have to discard this variable from our model.

Introducing Gross National Income

Results	

Observations	183
Adjusted R Square	0.4170
Statistic F	33.5488
	P-Value (0.000)
Dependent Variable(s)	**Parameters**
Expected Years of Schooling	1.8973
	P-Value (0.002)
Percentage of Women in Parliament	53.8028
	P-Value (0.000)
Mean Years of Schooling	1.7081
	P-Value (0.003)
Gross National Product	-0.00023
	P-Value (0.001)

Table 8

According to these results, the variables "expected years of schooling," "percentage of women in parliament," "mean years of schooling" and "GNI per capita," are significant. The p-values of their parameters are less than 0.05, as is the p-value for F. The adjusted R2 value is 0.417; this is an average result because the value added by the GNI Per Capita is approximately 0.03.

Model Selection
In order to understand which model is the most suitable for the present analysis' objective of identifying which development factors play a significant role in increasing a country's WBL Index Score, alongside the percentage of women in parliament, we proceeded with an analysis to identify, and discard, the less suitable options.

Expected years of schooling and the percentage of women in parliament
The model including "expected years of schooling" and "the percentage of women in parliament" as variables to explain average changes in the WBL Index Score presents encouraging results: the model has a relatively high adjusted R2 value of 0.37 and the parameters are significant. Additionally, the aggregated value of adding the percentage of women in parliament is quite high since the R2 increases by 0.11.

Discarding life expectancy
The "life expectancy" variable will be discarded from our model since the p-value for its parameter is not significant. This suggests that there is not enough evidence to prove, with 95% confidence, that changes in life expectancy can explain changes in the WBL Index scores.

Discarding GNI per capita
While the addition of the variable "GNI per capita" to our model increases the adjusted R2 value of the regression, the increase is relatively low (3%). Furthermore, when we add this variable to the equation, the value of the parameter is negative

(-0.00023). This tells us that the correlation is negative. In consequence, adding "GNI per capita" to the model would require further analysis since this counterintuitive result could be explained by the control procedure relative to the multiple linear model. Due to time constraints, and the relatively low added value of this variable to the equation, we have chosen to discard it. However, this point presents a potential subject of inquiry for future research.

Discarding mean years of education
The variable for "mean years of education" has been discarded based on the principle of parsimony. First, the aggregated value of adding this variable to the model is relatively low, as the adjusted R2 increases by only 0.014. Secondly, conserving "mean years of education" could introduce multicollinearity into the model because this variable is highly related to "expected years of schooling" (correlation coefficient=0.81). Finally, "mean years of education" does not add any unique information to this analysis. The main objective of this exercise was to identify any central development factors that are positively correlated to the percentage of women in parliament and the WBL Index Score. We have identified the most significant variable, namely education as measured by "expected years of schooling."

Most suitable model
The most suitable model to explain the influence of development on the WBL Index Score, alongside the percentage of women in parliament, includes the percentage of women in parliament and "expected years of schooling" as explicative variables.

Interpretation
By adding variables of significance, as determined by the regression, we have the following equation: **Y=31.08+2.4X1+52.5X2.**[21] This tells us that:

1. All else equal, an increase of one expected year of schooling is correlated to an average increase in the WBL Index Score.
2. All else equal, an increase in the proportion of women in parliament is associated with an average increase in the WBL Index.

Conclusion
Through the present analysis, we identified "expected years of schooling" as a complementary variable to the percentage of women in parliament in explaining variations in the WBL Index Score. Therefore, we can conclude that "expected years of schooling," in addition to the percentage of women in parliament, has a positive impact on legislative frameworks that either reduce socio-economic barriers for women or advance their status in society.

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[21] Y=WBL Index Score
X1=Expected years of schooling
X2=Percentage of women in parliament

Despite a lack of previous research proving a connection between women's political representation and level of education (Horowitz 2009), the findings of this study are able to introduce the educational variable alongside the proportion of women in parliament as a possible explanation for improvements in the socio-economic legal frameworks that include women. Not surprisingly, education was mentioned several times by women parliamentarians throughout the survey as an effective way to remove barriers to women's political participation, such as entering parliament. Education also acts as a useful mechanism for advancing legal frameworks that reduce socio-economic barriers for women, according to the survey responses.

This conclusion is critical. It helps cultivate a better understanding of which factors may impact legal frameworks that repair socio-economic gender-based inequalities by adding a development variable into the model. Consequently, we can also presume that SDG 5 and SDG 4 are related as improvements in education, advancements in legislation that promotes socio-economic equality between women and men, and an increased representation of women in parliaments are correlated. This could also act as a useful point of recommendation for Members of Parliament when examining how they can better achieve legal improvements in gender equality.

The way forward: Final Results

"*Gender equality is more than a goal in itself. It is a precondition for meeting the challenge of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development and building good governance.*"

- Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations (1997-2006), April 1998

The results of this report offer critical insights regarding the potential impacts that an increase in the proportion of women in parliament may have on legislation that advances women's socio-economic standing in society, in addition to exposing significant obstacles that female parliamentarians face when entering parliament. Furthermore, both the statistical and qualitative analyses provide valuable information regarding the interrelatedness of gender equality and international development.

Not only do these findings have a consequential capacity to drive greater equality between women and men in politics, but they are also crucial because they underline the importance of achieving gender equality to fulfill the promises of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The results of this paper are also noteworthy in the context of 2020, which marks 25 years since the passing of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.

In this section, we summarize the report results thus offering potential pathways for political leadership and policy intervention, both of which are necessary to accelerate equality between women and men in parliaments and within legal frameworks.

Results

This paper provides a cross-country measurement on the effect that women in parliament have on the existence of legislation that reduces socio-economic obstacles for women or, alternatively, legislation that advances women's socio-economic status as measured by the Women, Business and the Law Index. The analysis reveals a positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the WBL Index Score.[22] This means that an increase in the number of women in parliament is correlated to an improvement in existing legal frameworks that address socio-economic inequalities between men and women.

Consequently, these results indicate that quotas may have a significant impact on gender equal legal frameworks within national settings. Devlin and Elgie (2008)

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[22]The WBL Index measures legal differences between women's and men's access to socio-economic opportunities in 190 economies across eight indicators and was utilized for this article as a benchmark for gender equality.

note that in Rwanda the introduction of quotas resulted in women's issues being raised more easily and more often in parliamentary debate. This argument is supported by almost 60% of interviewed parliamentarians, from across geographical regions, who acknowledge gender quotas as an important mechanism to meaningfully advancing women's political participation.

The results suggest that the implementation of affirmative action legislation in the form of quotas may help to increase the number of women in parliaments. As mentioned in detail in the literature review, the figure of 30% is often cited as a threshold for the substantive representation of women. Grey (2006) prefers to suggest different thresholds depending on the desired outcome: 15% may allow women politicians to alter the political agenda, but 40% is necessary for gender sensitive policies to be enacted.

While a majority of parliamentarians participating in the survey agrees that quotas most certainly have an impact on the descriptive representation of women in politics, their responses, and the literature, suggest that quota systems are not strong enough on their own and must be institutionalized to a greater extent. It is also necessary to underscore that quotas cannot create substantive change or eradicate inequalities in legislation and within parliaments without other means of support. In some countries, academics and politicians alike recommend the usage of mandatory quotas, while others lament quotas' failure to catalyze categorical change because they are not sufficiently enforced.

The results of the quantitative analysis are also able to offer a bit of insight as to why some countries may experience a greater positive impact as a result of quotas or the increased number of women in parliaments. According to the statistical analysis, variations in the proportion of women in parliament seem to better explain variations in the WBL Index Score in countries when incorporating the Human Development Index into the model.[23]

These findings are supported by Krook (2010b), who demonstrates that factors impacting the descriptive representation of women are not necessarily the same across countries. Meanwhile, Stockmer (2014) pinpoints development itself as a factor in explaining an increase of the proportion of women in parliament. Another important discovery offered by the statistical analysis, and supported by the qualitative results, is that "expected years of schooling," as defined by the HDI, in addition to the percentage of women in parliament, is positively correlated to legislative frameworks that either reduce socio-economic barriers for women or advance their socio-economic status in society.

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[23]The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development including a long and healthy life (health), knowledgeability (education) and a decent standard of living.

This particular conclusion is crucial for several reasons. First, it allows for a deeper understanding of which development factors may affect legislation that repairs gender inequalities. Second, we can suppose that Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5, on gender equality, and SDG 4, on education, are related. Therefore, by improving a country's education outcomes, we would expect to see positive improvements in socio-economic legal frameworks that advance gender equality. Survey responses also underscore this point as several female parliamentarians directly highlight the link between education and women's representation, which is connected to cultural narratives as well.

These results would suggest that an integrated approach to economic and social development that includes specific references to gender equality in legislation is an important step to take toward advancing equality. As the logic behind the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) shows, only by addressing gender inequality as a factor of development can the global community achieve the targets set for the 2030 Agenda.

Whereas the quantitative analysis offers a key overview of the relationships among the number of women in parliament, a country's level of development and the quality of legal frameworks that advances socio-economic equality between women and men, the qualitative results are able to provide more specific insights as to what obstacles women parliamentarians confront in their daily work.

The qualitative survey was designed, in conjunction to the quantitative analysis, to help discern which distinct obstacles women parliamentarians may face entering parliament or while producing, passing or proposing legislation that either removes barriers preventing women from accessing equal socio-economic opportunities or legislation that advances women's socio-economic standing in society.

The first major obstacle uncovered by the survey results was the perceived impact of harmful cultural narratives derived from patriarchal foundations. The results of our qualitative analysis suggest that perceptions of women's capacity as political leaders may have a strong influence on women's ability to enter parliament.

Of the 21 parliamentarians, spread across geographical regions, 33% answered that perceptions of female leadership have a "great" impact on the number of women in their countries' parliaments. Another 33% noted that perceptions have a "substantial" impact on entering parliament. None of the respondents concluded that cultural and/or societal perceptions of women as leaders have no impact on the percentage of women in parliament. In fact, 86% of survey participants cited perceptions as having some impact.

Additionally, participating parliamentarians specifically identified a masculine parliamentary culture as harmful to women's participation and legislation that

affects women, in addition to citing a lack of confidence in women's ability to address certain "hard policy" subjects; this is viewed by some respondents as a direct result of discriminatory perceptions.

In addition to altering men's perceptions of female leadership, parliamentarians' responses define the need to alter women's own perceptions of what they can accomplish as well. Education may be an important tool in dispelling negative gender perceptions. Therefore, in direct line with quantitative results demonstrating a correlation between education, the descriptive representation of women in parliament and the quality of legal frameworks that repair socio-economic inequalities between women and men, this paper finds that investment in education may be an innovative pathway to improving gender equality in politics and society.

Other significant obstacles that women confront upon entering parliament include pre-existing legislation, party politics and agendas, and economic inequalities. Party agendas and politics are described as substantial barriers to improving women's socio-economic status through legislative initiatives. In fact, some Members of Parliament state that the power politics within parties and between branches of government determine the support or rejection of certain legislation. Pre-existing legislation may also dictate whether or not female parliamentarians experience a vicious or virtuous cycle when passing, proposing or producing legislation that addresses women's socio-economic inequalities.

This paper has uncovered an inextricable network of relationships among the descriptive representation of women in parliaments, legal frameworks that repair socio-economic gender-based inequalities and development. In addition, it presents explicit insights that highlight which barriers may hinder progress for women entering parliament and when passing or introducing this type of legislation. As Kofi Annan's words underscore, to see improvement in both sustainable development, democratic governance, education and more, we must view equality between women and men, boys and girls, and people of all genders not as an addition to the global sustainable development agenda, but rather as a prerequisite for any future progress.

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Qualitative series of interview surveys conducted between May 15th, 2020 and June 17th, 2020 with 21 women parliamentarians from across geographical regions.

Data Appendix

Annex 1: Data used for the simple regressions

Country	WBL Overall Index	MOBILITY	WORKPLACE	PAY	MARRIAGE	PARENTHOOD	ENTREPRENEURSHIP	ASSETS	PENSION	% of women
Afghanistan	38.1	100	100	25	80	20	75	100	75	23.60%
Albania	91.3	100	100	100	80	80	100	100	100	29.30%
Algeria	57.5	75	100	100	60	60	100	60	75	25.80%
Angola	73.1	100	50	50	100	80	75	100	25	30.00%
Antigua and Barbuda	66.3	50	75	0	20	20	75	40	25	11.10%
Argentina	76.3	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	38.80%
Armenia	82.5	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	100	24.20%
Australia	96.9	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	50	30.00%
Austria	94.4	75	75	50	60	60	75	40	25	37.20%
Azerbaijan	78.8	25	0	50	20	0	75	40	50	16.80%
Bahamas, The	81.3	100	50	50	100	60	100	100	25	12.80%
Bahrain	40.0	75	50	75	100	0	75	80	75	15.00%
Bangladesh	49.4	100	100	100	100	40	50	80	75	20.70%
Barbados	76.9	100	75	50	100	60	75	100	50	20.00%
Belarus	75.6	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	25	34.50%
Belgium	100.0	100	50	75	100	60	75	100	100	38.00%
Belize	79.4	100	50	50	80	80	75	100	50	9.40%
Benin	74.4	75	100	50	100	20	75	100	75	7.20%
Bhutan	71.9	100	100	100	100	20	75	60	75	14.90%
Bolivia	82.5	100	100	25	100	80	75	100	100	53.10%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	85.0	100	100	75	80	20	75	100	75	21.40%
Botswana	63.8	75	100	75	100	40	75	100	75	9.50%
Brazil	81.9	100	50	75	80	60	75	100	100	15.00%
Brunei Darussalam	53.1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	75	9.10%
Bulgaria	90.6	100	100	0	80	40	75	100	100	25.80%
Burkina Faso	76.9	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	13.40%
Burundi	73.1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	36.40%
Cabo Verde	86.3	50	0	0	20	0	75	40	75	23.60%
Cambodia	75.0	100	100	25	100	40	100	100	50	20.00%
Cameroon	56.9	100	100	75	100	80	100	100	50	31.10%
Canada	97.5	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	75	26.90%
Central African Republic	71.3	50	75	25	20	80	50	60	100	8.60%
Chad	66.3	100	50	75	100	60	75	60	75	14.90%

Country	Score									%
Chile	77.5	100	100	0	100	80	100	100	50	22.60%
China	75.6	0	75	25	20	20	75	40	50	24.90%
Colombia	81.9	75	75	25	60	60	75	40	100	18.70%
Comoros	58.8	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	6.10%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	70.0	100	75	75	100	60	75	100	50	10.30%
Congo, Rep.	46.3	100	50	50	60	20	75	40	25	11.30%
Costa Rica	80.0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	45.60%
Côte d'Ivoire	78.1	100	75	75	80	20	75	80	100	11.00%
Croatia	93.8	100	100	75	80	20	75	100	100	20.50%
Cyprus	91.3	50	25	0	40	40	75	40	50	17.90%
Czech Republic	93.8	100	50	25	60	20	75	40	25	22.50%
Denmark	100.0	75	75	50	100	40	75	100	100	37.40%
Djibouti	61.9	100	100	100	100	40	75	80	75	26.20%
Dominica	62.5	75	50	75	100	80	75	80	75	25.00%
Dominican Republic	86.3	100	25	50	100	0	75	80	75	26.80%
Ecuador	89.4	100	75	75	100	60	75	100	75	38.00%
Egypt, Arab Rep.	45.0	75	50	75	20	40	75	40	25	14.90%
El Salvador	88.8	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	31.00%
Equatorial Guinea	51.9	100	100	75	100	80	100	100	100	20.00%
Eritrea	69.4	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	22.00%
Estonia	97.5	100	50	50	100	80	75	100	50	28.70%
Eswatini	43.8	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	7.20%
Ethiopia	71.9	100	100	50	100	20	75	80	75	38.80%
Fiji	74.4	100	100	75	100	100	100	100	75	19.60%
Finland	97.5	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	41.50%
France	100.0	75	75	50	100	60	75	100	100	39.70%
Gabon	57.5	75	25	25	100	0	75	80	75	17.90%
Gambia, The	74.4	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	10.30%
Georgia	79.4	75	50	50	20	40	75	40	25	14.80%
Germany	97.5	50	100	50	80	60	75	80	100	30.90%
Ghana	75.0	75	100	25	60	40	75	100	100	13.10%
Greece	97.5	100	100	100	80	40	50	80	25	18.70%
Grenada	77.5	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	25	46.70%
Guatemala	70.6	100	100	100	80	40	75	40	25	19.00%
Guinea	65.0	75	50	100	100	20	75	100	100	22.80%
Guinea-Bissau	42.5	100	25	50	80	60	75	100	75	13.70%
Guyana	86.9	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	31.90%
Haiti	61.3	75	75	50	20	40	100	60	100	2.50%
Honduras	75.0	50	100	100	100	20	75	100	100	21.10%
Hungary	96.9	100	75	50	100	60	100	100	75	12.60%
Iceland	100.0	100	100	50	100	80	100	100	50	38.10%
India	74.4	50	50	50	40	0	75	60	75	12.60%
Indonesia	64.4	100	100	75	60	40	100	40	75	18.20%

Country	Score	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	Pct
Iran, Islamic Rep.	31.3	100	75	25	100	20	75	80	50	5.90%
Iraq	45.0	100	25	50	100	40	75	80	100	25.20%
Ireland	97.5	75	25	75	100	0	75	60	100	22.20%
Israel	77.5	100	100	75	100	80	75	100	25	29.20%
Italy	97.5	50	25	75	40	0	75	60	100	35.70%
Jamaica	68.1	75	100	100	80	40	75	100	100	17.50%
Japan	81.9	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	25	10.20%
Jordan	31.9	75	25	50	100	20	75	100	100	15.40%
Kazakhstan	72.5	0	0	0	0	20	75	40	100	27.10%
Kenya	80.6	50	50	50	20	60	75	80	100	21.80%
Kiribati	78.8	100	100	75	100	60	100	100	75	6.50%
Korea, Rep.	85.0	75	100	25	60	80	75	100	100	17.10%
Kuwait	32.5	100	100	75	60	40	75	60	75	4.60%
Kyrgyz Republic	76.9	100	25	75	100	0	75	20	75	19.20%
Lao PDR	88.1	100	25	25	0	40	75	0	100	27.50%
Latvia	100.0	100	100	75	100	40	100	100	75	31.00%
Lebanon	52.5	100	25	75	80	0	50	100	100	4.70%
Lesotho	75.6	100	100	100	100	60	100	100	75	23.30%
Liberia	83.8	75	25	0	60	20	25	60	75	12.30%
Libya	50.0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	16.00%
Lithuania	93.8	100	100	75	80	20	100	100	25	21.30%
Luxembourg	100.0	50	50	25	40	80	50	60	100	25.00%
Madagascar	71.9	75	100	100	80	40	100	100	100	19.20%
Malawi	80.6	50	50	100	40	20	75	80	75	16.70%
Malaysia	50.0	100	100	100	100	60	75	100	50	14.40%
Maldives	73.8	25	25	0	40	40	75	40	50	4.70%
Mali	60.6	100	100	50	80	20	100	100	50	8.80%
Malta	88.8	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	11.90%
Marshall Islands	58.8	100	50	50	100	80	100	100	50	9.10%
Mauritania	45.6	100	100	75	60	60	100	100	75	20.30%
Mauritius	91.9	100	100	50	80	20	75	100	75	11.60%
Mexico	83.8	100	75	75	80	60	75	100	100	48.20%
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	61.3	100	25	75	80	0	75	60	75	0.00%
Moldova	84.4	100	75	75	100	100	100	100	25	22.80%
Mongolia	82.5	100	100	75	100	60	100	100	25	17.10%
Montenegro	81.9	100	100	100	60	60	75	80	100	23.50%
Morocco	75.6	100	100	25	100	80	100	100	50	20.50%
Mozambique	76.9	100	100	75	100	100	100	100	100	39.60%
Myanmar	58.8	100	100	50	60	80	100	40	75	11.30%
Namibia	86.3	100	25	75	100	0	75	20	75	46.20%
Nepal	67.5	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	32.70%
Netherlands	97.5	75	75	25	80	40	75	100	100	31.30%
New Zealand	94.4	75	75	50	60	60	50	60	100	40.00%
Nicaragua	86.3	100	100	50	80	60	75	100	50	44.60%

Niger	59.4	100	100	25	100	40	75	80	75	17.00%
Nigeria	63.1	75	25	50	80	60	75	80	25	5.60%
North Macedonia	85.0	75	50	75	80	20	100	100	100	38.30%
Norway	96.9	100	75	75	60	100	75	60	75	40.80%
Oman	38.8	100	100	25	100	80	75	100	25	1.20%
Pakistan	49.4	75	100	100	100	40	75	100	100	20.20%
Palau	58.8	100	100	50	100	80	75	100	50	12.50%
Panama	79.4	75	75	100	40	40	75	40	25	18.30%
Papua New Guinea	60.0	100	100	100	80	20	75	40	25	0.00%
Paraguay	94.4	100	100	25	60	60	75	40	100	15.00%
Peru	95.0	100	100	75	80	80	75	100	50	30.00%
Philippines	78.8	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	29.50%
Poland	93.8	100	100	50	40	60	100	60	50	29.10%
Portugal	97.5	50	25	25	40	20	75	60	75	35.70%
Qatar	32.5	100	100	25	100	40	75	100	100	9.80%
Romania	90.6	50	100	100	80	40	75	40	75	20.70%
Russian Federation	73.1	100	100	0	100	80	100	100	50	15.80%
Rwanda	78.1	100	50	75	40	40	75	60	75	61.30%
Samoa	80.0	25	0	0	0	0	75	40	100	10.00%
San Marino	80.0	100	100	50	60	80	75	60	100	25.00%
São Tomé and Príncipe	74.4	100	100	75	100	80	100	100	100	14.50%
Saudi Arabia	38.1	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	19.90%
Senegal	63.8	100	100	75	100	40	100	100	75	41.80%
Serbia	93.8	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	37.70%
Seychelles	76.3	75	100	75	100	80	100	100	100	21.20%
Sierra Leone	63.1	0	0	50	0	60	75	40	25	12.30%
Singapore	82.5	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	23.00%
Slovak Republic	94.4	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	20.00%
Slovenia	93.8	100	50	50	20	60	100	40	75	24.40%
Solomon Islands	56.9	75	75	75	20	60	50	20	100	2.00%
Somalia	46.9	25	100	50	0	20	75	40	50	24.40%
South Africa	88.1	100	100	75	100	80	100	100	75	42.70%
South Sudan	70.0	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	28.50%
Spain	97.5	75	25	50	100	0	75	100	75	41.10%
Sri Lanka	65.6	100	100	75	80	80	75	100	100	5.30%
St. Kitts and Nevis	71.3	100	100	75	80	60	100	100	75	13.30%
St. Lucia	83.8	100	50	50	80	60	75	100	25	16.70%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	68.1	75	25	50	80	0	100	60	75	13.00%
Sudan	29.4	50	75	50	100	0	75	80	75	27.70%
Suriname	66.3	100	100	75	100	80	75	100	50	29.40%
Sweden	100.0	100	100	100	100	40	75	100	100	47.30%

Country	WBL									%
Switzerland	85.6	50	75	0	0	20	75	40	100	32.50%
Syrian Arab Republic	36.9	100	100	50	60	60	75	100	75	13.20%
Tajikistan	78.8	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	100	19.00%
Thailand	75.0	100	100	50	100	80	100	100	0	5.40%
Timor-Leste	83.1	100	100	50	100	80	100	100	50	40.00%
Togo	84.4	100	25	50	100	20	75	100	75	16.50%
Tonga	58.8	25	25	25	0	0	75	40	25	7.40%
Trinidad and Tobago	75.0	100	100	75	80	80	100	100	75	31.00%
Tunisia	70.0	100	100	100	100	100	75	100	100	35.90%
Turkey	82.5	75	100	100	80	20	100	80	75	17.40%
Uganda	70.0	100	50	50	80	100	75	100	100	34.90%
Ukraine	78.8	0	100	25	20	0	75	40	50	11.60%
United Arab Emirates	30.0	75	25	100	20	60	0	60	75	22.50%
United Kingdom	97.5	100	100	75	60	20	75	100	25	32.00%
United States	91.3	100	100	100	80	100	100	100	100	23.60%
Uruguay	88.8	100	25	50	20	20	0	60	75	22.20%
Uzbekistan	67.5	75	75	25	60	20	50	40	50	16.00%
Vanuatu	58.1	100	25	75	100	0	75	20	75	0.00%
Venezuela, RB	85.0	100	100	75	80	40	100	100	100	22.20%
Vietnam	78.8	100	100	50	80	80	75	100	50	26.70%
Yemen, Rep.	26.9	0	0	25	20	20	75	40	75	0.30%
Zambia	78.8	75	50	25	100	0	75	80	75	18.00%
Zimbabwe	86.9	100	100	100	100	80	100	100	75	31.90%

Annex 2: Database showing the percentage of women in parliament and the level of income

Country	WBL	Percentage of women	UMI	LMI	Low Income	Level of income
Antigua and Barbuda	66.3	11.10%	0	0	0	High income
Australia	96.9	30.00%	0	0	0	High income
Austria	94.4	37.20%	0	0	0	High income
Bahamas, The	81.3	12.80%	0	0	0	High income
Bahrain	40.0	15.00%	0	0	0	High income
Barbados	76.9	20.00%	0	0	0	High income
Belgium	100.0	38.00%	0	0	0	High income
Brunei Darussalam	53.1	9.10%	0	0	0	High income
Canada	97.5	26.90%	0	0	0	High income
Chile	77.5	22.60%	0	0	0	High income
Croatia	93.8	20.50%	0	0	0	High income
Cyprus	91.3	17.90%	0	0	0	High income
Czech Republic	93.8	22.50%	0	0	0	High income
Denmark	100.0	37.40%	0	0	0	High income
Estonia	97.5	28.70%	0	0	0	High income

Finland	**97.5**	41.50%	0	0	0	High income
France	**100.0**	39.70%	0	0	0	High income
Germany	**97.5**	30.90%	0	0	0	High income
Greece	**97.5**	18.70%	0	0	0	High income
Hungary	**96.9**	12.60%	0	0	0	High income
Iceland	**100.0**	38.10%	0	0	0	High income
Ireland	**97.5**	22.20%	0	0	0	High income
Israel	**77.5**	29.20%	0	0	0	High income
Italy	**97.5**	35.70%	0	0	0	High income
Japan	**81.9**	10.20%	0	0	0	High income
Korea, Rep.	**85.0**	17.10%	0	0	0	High income
Kuwait	**32.5**	4.60%	0	0	0	High income
Latvia	**100.0**	31.00%	0	0	0	High income
Lithuania	**93.8**	21.30%	0	0	0	High income
Luxembourg	**100.0**	25.00%	0	0	0	High income
Malta	**88.8**	11.90%	0	0	0	High income
Netherlands	**97.5**	31.30%	0	0	0	High income
New Zealand	**94.4**	40.00%	0	0	0	High income
Norway	**96.9**	40.80%	0	0	0	High income
Oman	**38.8**	1.20%	0	0	0	High income
Palau	**58.8**	12.50%	0	0	0	High income
Panama	**79.4**	18.30%	0	0	0	High income
Poland	**93.8**	29.10%	0	0	0	High income
Portugal	**97.5**	35.70%	0	0	0	High income
Qatar	**32.5**	9.80%	0	0	0	High income
San Marino	**80.0**	25.00%	0	0	0	High income
Saudi Arabia	**38.1**	19.90%	0	0	0	High income
Seychelles	**76.3**	21.20%	0	0	0	High income
Singapore	**82.5**	23.00%	0	0	0	High income
Slovak Republic	**94.4**	20.00%	0	0	0	High income
Slovenia	**93.8**	24.40%	0	0	0	High income
Spain	**97.5**	41.10%	0	0	0	High income
St. Kitts and Nevis	**71.3**	13.30%	0	0	0	High income
Sweden	**100.0**	47.30%	0	0	0	High income
Switzerland	**85.6**	32.50%	0	0	0	High income
Trinidad and Tobago	**75.0**	31.00%	0	0	0	High income
United Arab Emirates	**30.0**	22.50%	0	0	0	High income
United Kingdom	**97.5**	32.00%	0	0	0	High income
United States	**91.3**	23.60%	0	0	0	High income
Uruguay	**88.8**	22.20%	0	0	0	High income
Afghanistan	**38.1**	23.60%	0	0	1	Low income
Benin	**74.4**	7.20%	0	0	1	Low income
Burkina Faso	**76.9**	13.40%	0	0	1	Low income
Burundi	**73.1**	36.40%	0	0	1	Low income
Central African Republic	**71.3**	8.60%	0	0	1	Low income
Chad	**66.3**	14.90%	0	0	1	Low income

Congo, Dem. Rep.	**70.0**	10.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Eritrea	**69.4**	22.00%	0	0	1	Low income
Ethiopia	**71.9**	38.80%	0	0	1	Low income
Gambia, The	**74.4**	10.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Guinea	**65.0**	22.80%	0	0	1	Low income
Guinea-Bissau	**42.5**	13.70%	0	0	1	Low income
Haiti	**61.3**	2.50%	0	0	1	Low income
Liberia	**83.8**	12.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Madagascar	**71.9**	19.20%	0	0	1	Low income
Malawi	**80.6**	16.70%	0	0	1	Low income
Mali	**60.6**	8.80%	0	0	1	Low income
Mozambique	**76.9**	39.60%	0	0	1	Low income
Nepal	**67.5**	32.70%	0	0	1	Low income
Niger	**59.4**	17.00%	0	0	1	Low income
Rwanda	**78.1**	61.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Sierra Leone	**63.1**	12.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Somalia	**46.9**	24.40%	0	0	1	Low income
South Sudan	**70.0**	28.50%	0	0	1	Low income
Syrian Arab Republic	**36.9**	13.20%	0	0	1	Low income
Tajikistan	**78.8**	19.00%	0	0	1	Low income
Togo	**84.4**	16.50%	0	0	1	Low income
Uganda	**70.0**	34.90%	0	0	1	Low income
Yemen, Rep.	**26.9**	0.30%	0	0	1	Low income
Angola	**73.1**	30.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Bangladesh	**49.4**	20.70%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Bhutan	**71.9**	14.90%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Bolivia	**82.5**	53.10%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Cabo Verde	**86.3**	23.60%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Cambodia	**75.0**	20.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Cameroon	**56.9**	31.10%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Comoros	**58.8**	6.10%	0	1	0	**Lower middle income**
Congo, Rep.	**46.3**	11.30%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Côte d'Ivoire	**78.1**	11.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Djibouti	**61.9**	26.20%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Egypt, Arab Rep.	**45.0**	14.90%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
El Salvador	**88.8**	31.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Eswatini	**43.8**	7.20%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Ghana	**75.0**	13.10%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Honduras	**75.0**	21.10%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
India	**74.4**	12.60%	0	1	0	Lower middle income

Indonesia	**64.4**	18.20%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Kenya	**80.6**	21.80%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Kiribati	**78.8**	6.50%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Kyrgyz Republic	**76.9**	19.20%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Lao PDR	**88.1**	27.50%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Lesotho	**75.6**	23.30%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Mauritania	**45.6**	20.30%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	**61.3**	0.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Moldova	**84.4**	22.80%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Mongolia	**82.5**	17.10%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Morocco	**75.6**	20.50%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Myanmar	**58.8**	11.30%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Nicaragua	**86.3**	44.60%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Nigeria	**63.1**	5.60%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Pakistan	**49.4**	20.20%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Papua New Guinea	**60.0**	0.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Philippines	**78.8**	29.50%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
São Tomé and Príncipe	**74.4**	14.50%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Senegal	63.8	41.80%	0	1	0	**Lower middle income**
Solomon Islands	56.9	2.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Sudan	29.4	27.70%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Timor-Leste	83.1	40.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Tunisia	70.0	35.90%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Ukraine	78.8	11.60%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Uzbekistan	67.5	16.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Vanuatu	58.1	0.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Vietnam	78.8	26.70%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Zambia	78.8	18.00%	0	1	0	Lower middle income
Zimbabwe	86.9	31.90%	1	0	0	**Lower middle income**
Albania	91.3	29.30%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Algeria	57.5	25.80%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Argentina	76.3	38.80%	1	0	0	**Upper middle income**
Armenia	82.5	24.20%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Azerbaijan	78.8	16.80%	1	0	0	Upper middle income

Country	Value	Percent	C1	C2	C3	Income group
Belarus	**75.6**	34.50%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Belize	**79.4**	9.40%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Bosnia and Herzegovina	**85.0**	21.40%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Botswana	**63.8**	9.50%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Brazil	**81.9**	15.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Bulgaria	**90.6**	25.80%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
China	**75.6**	24.90%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Colombia	**81.9**	18.70%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Costa Rica	**80.0**	45.60%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Dominica	**62.5**	25.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Dominican Republic	**86.3**	26.80%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Ecuador	**89.4**	38.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Equatorial Guinea	**51.9**	20.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Fiji	**74.4**	19.60%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Gabon	**57.5**	17.90%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Georgia	**79.4**	14.80%	1	0	0	**Upper middle income**
Grenada	**77.5**	46.70%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Guatemala	**70.6**	19.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Guyana	**86.9**	31.90%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Iran, Islamic Rep.	**31.3**	5.90%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Iraq	**45.0**	25.20%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Jamaica	**68.1**	17.50%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Jordan	**31.9**	15.40%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Kazakhstan	**72.5**	27.10%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Lebanon	**52.5**	4.70%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Libya	**50.0**	16.00%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Malaysia	**50.0**	14.40%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Maldives	**73.8**	4.70%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Marshall Islands	**58.8**	9.10%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Mauritius	**91.9**	11.60%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Mexico	**83.8**	48.20%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Montenegro	**81.9**	23.50%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
Namibia	**86.3**	46.20%	1	0	0	Upper middle income
North Macedonia	**85.0**	38.30%	1	0	0	Upper middle income

Country		WBL INDEX	% Women in Parliament	HDI	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI Per capita	Income
Paraguay	94.4	15.00%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Peru	95.0	30.00%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Romania	90.6	20.70%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Russian Federation	73.1	15.80%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Samoa	80.0	10.00%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Serbia	93.8	37.70%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
South Africa	88.1	42.70%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Sri Lanka	65.6	5.30%	1	0	0				**Upper middle income**
St. Lucia	83.8	16.70%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	68.1	13.00%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Suriname	66.3	29.40%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Thailand	75.0	5.40%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Tonga	58.8	7.40%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Turkey	82.5	17.40%	1	0	0				Upper middle income
Venezuela, RB	85.0	22.20%	1	0	0				Upper middle income

Annex 3: Database showing the percentage of women in parliament and the level of income

Country	WBL INDEX	% Women in Parliament	HDI	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI Per capita
Afghanistan	38.1	23.60%	0.496	64.5	10.1	3.9	1,746
Albania	91.3	29.30%	0.791	78.5	15.2	10.1	12,300
Algeria	57.5	25.80%	0.759	76.7	14.7	8.0	13,639
Angola	73.1	30.00%	0.574	60.8	11.8	5.1	5,555
Antigua and Barbuda	66.3	11.10%	0.776	76.9	12.5	9.3	22,201
Argentina	76.3	38.80%	0.83	76.5	17.6	10.6	17,611
Armenia	82.5	24.20%	0.76	74.9	13.2	11.8	9,277
Australia	96.9	30.00%	0.938	83.3	22.1	12.7	44,097
Austria	94.4	37.20%	0.914	81.4	16.3	12.6	46,231
Azerbaijan	78.8	16.80%	0.754	72.9	12.4	10.5	15,240
Bahamas	81.3	12.80%	0.805	73.8	12.8	11.5	28,395
Bahrain	40.0	15.00%	0.838	77.2	15.3	9.4	40,399
Bangladesh	49.4	20.70%	0.614	72.3	11.2	6.1	4,057

Barbados	76.9	20.00%	0.813	79.1	15.2	10.6	15,912
Belarus	75.6	34.50%	0.817	74.6	15.4	12.3	17,039
Belgium	100.0	38.00%	0.919	81.5	19.7	11.8	43,821
Belize	79.4	9.40%	0.72	74.5	13.1	9.8	7,136
Benin	74.4	7.20%	0.52	61.5	12.6	3.8	2,135
Bhutan	71.9	14.90%	0.617	71.5	12.1	3.1	8,609
Bolivia	82.5	53.10%	0.703	71.2	14.0	9.0	6,849
Bosnia and Herzegovina	85.0	21.40%	0.769	77.3	13.8	9.7	12,690
Botswana	63.8	9.50%	0.728	69.3	12.7	9.3	15,951
Brazil	81.9	15.00%	0.761	75.7	15.4	7.8	14,068
Brunei Darussalam	53.1	9.10%	0.845	75.7	14.4	9.1	76,389
Bulgaria	90.6	25.80%	0.816	74.9	14.8	11.8	19,646
Burkina Faso	76.9	13.40%	0.434	61.2	8.9	1.6	1,705
Burundi	73.1	36.40%	0.423	61.2	11.3	3.1	660
Cabo Verde	86.3	23.60%	0.651	72.8	11.9	6.2	6,513
Cambodia	75.0	20.00%	0.581	69.6	11.3	4.8	3,597
Cameroon	56.9	31.10%	0.563	58.9	12.7	6.3	3,291
Canada	97.5	26.90%	0.922	82.3	16.1	13.3	43,602
Central African Republic	71.3	8.60%	0.381	52.8	7.6	4.3	777
Chad	66.3	14.90%	0.401	54.0	7.5	2.4	1,716
Chile	77.5	22.60%	0.847	80.0	16.5	10.4	21,972
China	75.6	24.90%	0.758	76.7	13.9	7.9	16,127
Colombia	81.9	18.70%	0.761	77.1	14.6	8.3	12,896
Comoros	58.8	6.10%	0.538	64.1	11.2	4.9	2,426
Congo	46.3	11.30%	0.608	64.3	11.6	6.5	5,804
Costa Rica	80.0	45.60%	0.794	80.1	15.4	8.7	14,790
Cote d'Ivoire	78.1	11.00%	0.516	57.4	9.6	5.2	3,589
Croatia	93.8	20.50%	0.837	78.3	15.0	11.4	23,061
Cyprus	91.3	17.90%	0.873	80.8	14.7	12.1	33,100
Czech Republic	93.8	22.50%	0.891	79.2	16.8	12.7	31,597
Democratic Republic of the Congo	70.0	10.30%	0.459	60.4	9.7	6.8	800
Denmark	100.0	37.40%	0.93	80.8	19.1	12.6	48,836
Djibouti	61.9	26.20%	0.495	66.6	6.5	4.0	3,601
Dominica	62.5	25.00%	0.724	78.1	13.0	7.8	9,245
Dominican Republic	86.3	26.80%	0.745	73.9	14.1	7.9	15,074
Ecuador	89.4	38.00%	0.758	76.8	14.9	9.0	10,141
Egypt	45.0	14.90%	0.7	71.8	13.1	7.3	10,744
El Salvador	88.8	31.00%	0.667	73.1	12.0	6.9	6,973
Equatorial Guinea	51.9	20.00%	0.588	58.4	9.2	5.6	17,796
Eritrea	69.4	22.00%	0.434	65.9	5.0	3.9	1,708
Estonia	97.5	28.70%	0.882	78.6	16.1	13.0	30,379
Eswatini	43.8	7.20%	0.608	59.4	11.4	6.7	9,359
Ethiopia	71.9	38.80%	0.47	66.2	8.7	2.8	1,782
Fiji	74.4	19.60%	0.724	67.3	14.4	10.9	9,110
Finland	97.5	41.50%	0.925	81.7	19.3	12.4	41,779

Country							
France	100.0	39.70%	0.891	82.5	15.5	11.4	40,511
Gabon	57.5	17.90%	0.702	66.2	12.9	8.3	15,794
Gambia	74.4	10.30%	0.466	61.7	9.5	3.7	1,490
Georgia	79.4	14.80%	0.786	73.6	15.4	12.8	9,570
Germany	97.5	30.90%	0.939	81.2	17.1	14.1	46,946
Ghana	75.0	13.10%	0.596	63.8	11.5	7.2	4,099
Greece	97.5	18.70%	0.872	82.1	17.3	10.5	24,909
Grenada	77.5	46.70%	0.763	72.4	16.6	8.8	12,684
Guatemala	70.6	19.00%	0.651	74.1	10.6	6.5	7,378
Guinea	65.0	22.80%	0.466	61.2	9.0	2.7	2,211
Guinea-Bissau	42.5	13.70%	0.461	58.0	10.5	3.3	1,593
Guyana	86.9	31.90%	0.67	69.8	11.5	8.5	7,615
Haiti	61.3	2.50%	0.503	63.7	9.5	5.4	1,665
Honduras	75.0	21.10%	0.623	75.1	10.2	6.6	4,258
Hungary	96.9	12.60%	0.845	76.7	15.1	11.9	27,144
Iceland	100.0	38.10%	0.938	82.9	19.2	12.5	47,566
India	74.4	12.60%	0.647	69.4	12.3	6.5	6,829
Indonesia	64.4	18.20%	0.707	71.5	12.9	8.0	11,256
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	31.3	5.90%	0.797	76.5	14.7	10.0	18,166
Iraq	45.0	25.20%	0.689	70.5	11.1	7.3	15,365
Ireland	97.5	22.20%	0.942	82.1	18.8	12.5	55,660
Israel	77.5	29.20%	0.906	82.8	16.0	13.0	33,650
Italy	97.5	35.70%	0.883	83.4	16.2	10.2	36,141
Jamaica	68.1	17.50%	0.726	74.4	13.1	9.8	7,932
Japan	81.9	10.20%	0.915	84.5	15.2	12.8	40,799
Jordan	31.9	15.40%	0.723	74.4	11.9	10.5	8,268
Kazakhstan	72.5	27.10%	0.817	73.2	15.3	11.8	22,168
Kenya	80.6	21.80%	0.579	66.3	11.1	6.6	3,052
Kiribati	78.8	6.50%	0.623	68.1	11.8	7.9	3,917
Korea	85.0	17.10%	0.906	82.8	16.4	12.2	36,757
Kuwait	32.5	4.60%	0.808	75.4	13.8	7.3	71,164
Kyrgyzstan	76.9	19.20%	0.674	71.3	13.4	10.9	3,317
Lao People's Democratic Republic	88.1	27.50%	0.604	67.6	11.1	5.2	6,317
Latvia	100.0	31.00%	0.854	75.2	16.0	12.8	26,301
Lebanon	52.5	4.70%	0.73	78.9	11.3	8.7	11,136
Lesotho	75.6	23.30%	0.518	53.7	10.7	6.3	3,244
Liberia	83.8	12.30%	0.465	63.7	9.6	4.7	1,040
Libya	50.0	16.00%	0.708	72.7	12.8	7.6	11,685
Lithuania	93.8	21.30%	0.869	75.7	16.5	13.0	29,775
Luxembourg	100.0	25.00%	0.909	82.1	14.2	12.2	65,543
Madagascar	71.9	19.20%	0.521	66.7	10.4	6.1	1,404
Malawi	80.6	16.70%	0.485	63.8	11.0	4.6	1,159
Malaysia	50.0	14.40%	0.804	76.0	13.5	10.2	27,227
Maldives	73.8	4.70%	0.719	78.6	12.1	6.8	12,549
Mali	60.6	8.80%	0.427	58.9	7.6	2.4	1,965

Malta	88.8	11.90%	0.885	82.4	15.9	11.3	34,795
Marshall Islands	58.8	9.10%	0.698	73.9	12.4	10.9	4,633
Mauritania	45.6	20.30%	0.527	64.7	8.5	4.6	3,746
Mauritius	91.9	11.60%	0.796	74.9	15.0	9.4	22,724
Mexico	83.8	48.20%	0.767	75.0	14.3	8.6	17,628
Micronesia (Federated States of)	61.3	0.00%	0.614	67.8	11.5	7.7	3,700
Moldova	84.4	22.80%	0.711	71.8	11.6	11.6	6,833
Mongolia	82.5	17.10%	0.735	69.7	14.2	10.2	10,784
Montenegro	81.9	23.50%	0.816	76.8	15.0	11.4	17,511
Morocco	75.6	20.50%	0.676	76.5	13.1	5.5	7,480
Mozambique	76.9	39.60%	0.446	60.2	9.7	3.5	1,154
Myanmar	58.8	11.30%	0.584	66.9	10.3	5.0	5,764
Namibia	86.3	46.20%	0.645	63.4	12.6	6.9	9,683
Nepal	67.5	32.70%	0.579	70.5	12.2	4.9	2,748
Netherlands	97.5	31.30%	0.933	82.1	18.0	12.2	50,013
New Zealand	94.4	40.00%	0.921	82.1	18.8	12.7	35,108
Nicaragua	86.3	44.60%	0.651	74.3	12.2	6.8	4,790
Niger	59.4	17.00%	0.377	62.0	6.5	2.0	912
Nigeria	63.1	5.60%	0.534	54.3	9.7	6.5	5,086
North Macedonia	85.0	38.30%	0.759	75.7	13.5	9.7	12,874
Norway	96.9	40.80%	0.954	82.3	18.1	12.6	68,059
Oman	38.8	1.20%	0.834	77.6	14.7	9.7	37,039
Pakistan	49.4	20.20%	0.56	67.1	8.5	5.2	5,190
Palau	58.8	12.50%	0.814	73.7	15.6	12.4	16,720
Panama	79.4	18.30%	0.795	78.3	12.9	10.2	20,455
Papua New Guinea	60.0	0.00%	0.543	64.3	10.0	4.6	3,686
Paraguay	94.4	15.00%	0.724	74.1	12.7	8.5	11,720
Peru	95.0	30.00%	0.759	76.5	13.8	9.2	12,323
Philippines	78.8	29.50%	0.712	71.1	12.7	9.4	9,540
Poland	93.8	29.10%	0.872	78.5	16.4	12.3	27,626
Portugal	97.5	35.70%	0.85	81.9	16.3	9.2	27,935
Qatar	32.5	9.80%	0.848	80.1	12.2	9.7	110,489
Romania	90.6	20.70%	0.816	75.9	14.3	11.0	23,906
Russian Federation	73.1	15.80%	0.824	72.4	15.5	12.0	25,036
Rwanda	78.1	61.30%	0.536	68.7	11.2	4.4	1,959
Saint Kitts and Nevis	71.3	13.30%	0.777	74.6	13.6	8.5	26,770
Saint Lucia	83.8	16.70%	0.745	76.1	13.9	8.5	11,528
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	68.1	13.00%	0.728	72.4	13.6	8.6	11,746
Samoa	80.0	10.00%	0.707	73.2	12.5	10.6	5,885
San Marino	80.0	25.00%	-				
Sao Tome and Principe	74.4	14.50%	0.609	70.2	12.7	6.4	3,024
Saudi Arabia	38.1	19.90%	0.857	75.0	17.0	9.7	49,338
Senegal	63.8	41.80%	0.514	67.7	9.0	3.1	3,256
Serbia	93.8	37.70%	0.799	75.8	14.8	11.2	15,218
Seychelles	76.3	21.20%	0.801	73.3	15.5	9.7	25,077

Sierra Leone	63.1	12.30%	0.438	54.3	10.2	3.6	1,381
Singapore	82.5	23.00%	0.935	83.5	16.3	11.5	83,793
Slovakia	94.4	20.00%	0.857	77.4	14.5	12.6	30,672
Slovenia	93.8	24.40%	0.902	81.2	17.4	12.3	32,143
Solomon Islands	56.9	2.00%	0.557	72.8	10.2	5.5	2,027
Somalia	46.9	24.40%	-				
South Africa	88.1	42.70%	0.705	63.9	13.7	10.2	11,756
South Sudan	70.0	28.50%	0.413	57.6	5.0	4.8	1,455
Spain	97.5	41.10%	0.893	83.4	17.9	9.8	35,041
Sri Lanka	65.6	5.30%	0.78	76.8	14.0	11.1	11,611
Sudan	29.4	27.70%	0.507	65.1	7.7	3.7	3,962
Suriname	66.3	29.40%	0.724	71.6	12.9	9.1	11,933
Sweden	100.0	47.30%	0.937	82.7	18.8	12.4	47,955
Switzerland	85.6	32.50%	0.946	83.6	16.2	13.4	59,375
Syrian Arab Republic	36.9	13.20%	0.549	71.8	8.9	5.1	2,725
Tajikistan	78.8	19.00%	0.656	70.9	11.4	10.7	3,482
Tanzania	84.4	36.90%	0.528	65.0	8.0	6.0	2,805
Thailand	75.0	5.40%	0.765	76.9	14.7	7.7	16,129
Timor-Leste	83.1	40.00%	0.626	69.3	12.4	4.5	7,527
Togo	84.4	16.50%	0.513	60.8	12.6	4.9	1,593
Tonga	58.8	7.40%	0.717	70.8	14.3	11.2	5,783
Trinidad and Tobago	75.0	31.00%	0.799	73.4	13.0	11.0	28,497
Tunisia	70.0	35.90%	0.739	76.5	15.1	7.2	10,677
Turkey	82.5	17.40%	0.806	77.4	16.4	7.7	24,905
Uganda	70.0	34.90%	0.528	63.0	11.2	6.1	1,752
Ukraine	78.8	11.60%	0.75	72.0	15.1	11.3	7,994
United Arab Emirates	30.0	22.50%	0.866	77.8	13.6	11.0	66,912
United Kingdom	97.5	32.00%	0.92	81.2	17.4	13.0	39,507
United States of America	91.3	23.60%	0.92	78.9	16.3	13.4	56,140
Uruguay	88.8	22.20%	0.808	77.8	16.3	8.7	19,435
Uzbekistan	67.5	16.00%	0.71	71.6	12.0	11.5	6,462
Vanuatu	58.1	0.00%	0.597	70.3	11.4	6.8	2,808
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	85.0	22.20%	0.726	72.1	12.8	10.3	9,070
Vietnam	78.8	26.70%	0.693	75.3	12.7	8.2	6,220
Yemen	26.9	0.30%	0.463	66.1	8.7	3.2	1,433
Zambia	78.8	18.00%	0.591	63.5	12.1	7.1	3,582
Zimbabwe	86.9	31.90%	0.563	61.2	10.5	8.3	2,661